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ABSTRACT
Relating Justification Logic Modality and Type Theory in
Curry-Howard fashion
by
Konstantinos Pouliasis
Advisor: Distinguished Professor Sergei Artemov
This dissertation is a work in the intersection of Justification Logic (JL) and
Curry–Howard Isomorphism (CHI). Justification logic is an umbrella of modal
logics of knowledge with explicit evidence. Justification logics have been
used to tackle traditional problems in proof theory (in relation to Godel’s
provability) and philosophy (Gettier examples, Russel’s barn paradox). The
Curry–Howard Isomorphism or proofs-as-programs is an understanding of logic
that places logical studies in conjunction with type theory and – in current
developments – category theory. The point being that understanding a system
as a logic, a typed calculus and, a language of a class of categories constitutes
a useful discovery that can have many applications. The applications we
will be mainly concerned with are type systems for useful programming
language constructs. This work is structured in three parts: The first part
(chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4) is a a bird’s eye view into my research topics:
intuitionistic logic, justified modality and type theory. The relevant systems are
introduced syntactically together with main metatheoretic proof techniques
vwhich will be useful in the rest of the thesis. The second part (chapter 5,
chapter 6, chapter 7) features my main contributions. I will propose a modal
type system that extends simple type theory (or, isomorphically, intuitionistic
propositional logic) with elements of justification logic and will argue about
its computational significance. More specifically, I will show that the obtained
calculus characterizes certain computational phenomena related to linking (e.g.
module mechanisms, foreign function interfaces) that abound in semantics
of modern programming languages. I will present full metatheoretic results
obtained for this logic/ calculus utilizing techniques from the first part and
will provide proofs in the Appendix. The Appendix contains also information
about an implementation of our calculus in the metaprogramming framework
Makam. Finally, I conclude this work with a small “outro”, chapter 8, where
I informally show that the ideas underlying my contributions can be extended
in interesting ways.
.in memory of my grandparents and grandaunt: Aliki, Theodoros and Lambro
vi
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Introduction
The Curry–Howard Isomorphism (CHI) [16, 29] was first established as a
deep connection between explicit proofs in intuitionistic logic and programs
of a simple programming language that includes pairs, functions and union
types [42, 50]. This relation has been a central topic of study in the field
of type theory and has turned into the standard foundational approach to
studying and designing programming languages especially of the functional
paradigm. Since this relation has been established, the isomorphism has
been extended to more complex logics and correspondingly to more complex
programming language constructs. In the following I will be using Curry–
Howard Isomorphism (CHI) and proofs-as-programs interchangeably.
There are great benefits both for a logician and the programming language
designer in viewing things through the lenses of such a relation. From the
programming language perspective certain linguistic phenomena are given
1
2categorical characterizations that do not depend on implementation specifics.
For example the designer of the next hot programming language knows that
adding pairs would have to adhere to the corresponding constructs of logical
conjunction. In addition, adding more complex design features (e.g. state,
concurrency, exceptions etc) can be done in a structured, orthogonal, and
modular way by enriching the underlying logic and, correspondingly, the type
system(see e.g. [15, 22, 23, 36]).
It should not be a surprise that languages of the typed functional paradigm
have been gaining traction and more functional design principles are being
added to languages of the object oriented paradigm. There are two main
reasons for this, an old and a new. The older reason is mathematical cor-
rectness which is strongly related to the fact that reasoning about programs
(of the lambda calculus and its extensions) can be done in an equational
way, a property that is heavily connected to their underlying foundational
principles as we will see. Features such as side effects or concurrency in
the language are reflected via typing. For example, a program that changes
global state has a type that says so explicitly. Similarly, a program that
uses goto mechanisms would also register its behavior in its type. All in all,
even “impure”, non-functional constructs (state, mutable references, IO) are
added in a mathematical/ algebraic fashion under the CHI disciple. As a
result, reasoning about properties of such programs is significantly simpler.
Moreover, working within the strongly typed doctrine and in conjunction with
static type checking permits for the verification of meaningful properties of
3programs prior to their execution. Henceforth, the need for testing is reduced
to verify only non-trivial properties.
The renewed interest in functional programming owes a lot to the difficul-
ties of scaling concurrent programs in imperative programming paradigms. It
is very hard to scale programs that make unlimited use of side effects (such
as state change) in an implicit way (i.e. without leaving any trace in their
typing) from sequential to multithreaded style of computation. Programming
freedoms in traditional languages (paired with the easiness and textbook
familiarity of the Von Neumann model) come at a large cost if one takes
into account the need for proving correctness. The “purity” of programs
in the lambda calculus – and the delimited “impurity” in its extensions –
makes writing high-quality concurrent code an easier task. It is exciting to
see that important metatheoretic results in the area of combinatory logic as
e.g. the Church–Rosser property are the backbone of models for concurrent
computation in modern functional languages.
On the other hand, the logician has good reasons to study logics as rules
of program formation and reduction. First of all, such designs make logics
implementable “for free” in modern theorem provers using the programming
side of the correspondence. Secondly the study of logic in such a way has put
upfront a Gentzen-style treatment of logical connectives where emphasis is
given to the notion of proof, proof structure and proof reduction. This has
sparked studies for more refined versions of proof relevant deduction than the
ones discovered under the standard “axiomatic” approach (e.g. linear logics,
4substructural logics etc). As we will see, the Gentzen–Brouwer initiative
in logic does not merely call for change of axiomatization but for a “proof
relevant” interpretation of connectives that comes with a computational taste.
Metatheory is also standardized once one studies logic this way; scalable
techniques have been developed within the area of “proof-theoretic” semantics
that standardize the passage from natural deduction of a logic to its cut-free
calculus. [37, 47]. In other words, treating logics within a Curry–Howard
environment enriches logic as a discipline with good organizing principles.
Finally, proof relevant treatments of logic – pushed further by ideas of Martin-
Lo¨f Type Theory (MLTT) [35] have sparked a renewed interest in a foundation
of mathematics that stems from a treatment of proofs as the primitive objects
of mathematics.
In this work, we are interested in the study of extending Curry–Howard
Isomorphism (CHI) with basic necessity of justification logic. There is a
good reason to believe that this should be doable. Justification logic is a
logic that relates logical necessity with the existence of a proof construct
and that is exactly what working in realm of proof relevancy and CHI calls
for. There are challenges to this task, both syntactical and semantical. First
of all, there is a resemblance of the justification logic syntax with that of
simple type theory (e.g. the use of the semicolon a : A) that initially might
call for an antagonistic relation between the two systems. Of course, this
is not a substantial issue since the two typing relations can be “colored” in
a syntactical way. But resolving the syntactical overload would still leave
5a “meaning” question open; namely, how can one read the need of having
two proofs of the “same thing” in a system. The main contribution of this
work [43] it that it shows how such a relation of binding two kinds of proof
systems is quite natural and gives a basic reading of validity and necessity
on first, proof-theoretic principles. We will treat justification logic as a logic
of proof relevant validity. by tracing justification logic back to its origin as
an explicit, classical semantics to Brower-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) proof
constructs. We will present a modal logic that is based on this relation and
we will argue that such phenomena of binding two kinds of constructions
abound both in the realm of mathematical proofs as well as in the realm of
programming languages with constructs such as modules, foreign function
calls and dynamic linkers.
This work is structured in three parts: The first part (chapter 2, chapter 3,
chapter 4) is a revision of my second examination paper and constitutes a
bird’s eye view into my research topics: intuitionistic logic, justified modality
and type theory. The relevant systems are introduced syntactically together
with main metatheoretic proof techniques which will be useful in the rest
of the thesis. The second part (chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7) constitutes
my main contributions. I will propose a modal type system that extends
simple type theory (or, speaking from the logical side of CHI, intuitionistic
propositional logic) with elements of justification logic and will argue about
its computational significance. More specifically, I will show that the obtained
calculus characterizes certain computational phenomena that abound in mod-
6ern programming language semantics. I will present full metatheoretic results
obtained for this logic/ calculus utilizing techniques from the first part and will
provide proofs in the Appendix. In the Appendix, the interested reader can
find links to the active Github repository that contains an implementation of
this calculus (its term and type systems) in the metaprogramming framework
Makam as an additional “proof of concept” result, Finally, I conclude this
work with a small “outro”, chapter 8, where I informally show that the ideas
underlying my contributions can be extended in interesting ways.
Chapter 2
Intuitionistic Logic
2.1 Intuitionism
In this and the subsequent chapter, I will be presenting foundational work in
the intersection of Intuitionistic Logic and Type Theory. The presentation
is scaffolding following Robert Harper’s lecture videos in Homotopy Type
Theory [24] and the accompanying notes by students of the class [27]. I will
often deviate to standard textbooks in the field [9], [21], [42] to present
further important results.
2.1.1 A bird’s eye view
In a nutshell, Intuitionistic mathematics is a program in foundations of math-
ematics that extends Brouwer’s program [14]. Brouwer, in an almost Kantian
fashion, viewed mathematical reasoning as a human faculty and mathematics
7
8as a language of the “creative subject” aiming to communicate mathematical
concepts. The concept of algorithm as a step-by-step constructive process is
brought to the foreground in Brouwer’s program. As a result, intuitionistic
theories are amenable to computational interpretations. We are using the
terms intutionistic and constructive interchangeably.
For the purposes of this paper, the main diverging point of Brouwer’s
program, later explicated by Heyting [28] and Kolmogorov [31] [8], lies in
the treatment of proofs. In contrast to classical approaches to foundations
that treat proof objects as external to theories, the constructive approach
treats proofs as the fundamental forms of construction and hence, as first
class citizens. As a result, the constructive view of logic draws heavily from
proof theory and Gentzen’s developments [20]. For the reader interested also
in the philosophical implications of constructive foundations and antirealism,
Dummet’s treatment is a classic in the field [17].
It has to be emphasized that proofs in the intuitionistic approach are
treated as stand-alone and are not bound to formal systems (i.e the notion
of proof precedes that of a formal system). It is necessary, hence, to draw
a distinction between the notion of proof as construction and the notion of
proof in a formal system [25, 26].
A formal proof is a proof given in a fixed formal system and it is constructed
by the application of the rules in that system, recursively. Formal proofs can,
thus, be viewed as strings or go¨delizations of textual derivation in some fixed
system.
9As Harper puts it [26]“While formal proofs are always proofs (at least,
under the assumption of consistency of the underlying formal theory), a proof
need not be, or even have a representation as, a formal proof”. This conforms
with Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem, which precisely states that there exist
true propositions (with a proof in some formal system), but for which there
is no formal proof within the system in question. This openness of the nature
of proofs is necessary for a foundational treatment of proofs that respects
Go¨delian phenomena.
Following the same line of thought, and adopting the doctrine of proof
relevance for obtaining true judgments, leads to another main difference of
the constructive approach and the classical one i.e. the (default) absence of
the law of excluded middle.
2.2 IPL
Intuitionistic Propositional Logic (IPL) can be viewed as “the logic of proof
relevance” conforming with the intuitionistic view described in 2.1. To judge
a fact as true one may provide a proof appropriate of the fact. Proofs can be
synthesized to obtain proofs for more complex facts (introduction rules) and
consumed to provide proofs relevant for other facts (elimination rules). The
importance of the interplay between introduction and elimination rules was
developed by Gentzen. A discussion on the meaning of the logical connectives
that is prevalent in MLTT can be found in [34]. Following the presentation
10
style by Martin-Lo¨f we split the notions of judgment and proposition. We
have two main kinds of judgments:
• Judgments on propositionality or typeability. Propositions are the subjects
of logical judgments. If something is judged to be a proposition then
it belongs to the universe of discourse and can be mentioned in logical
judgments.
• Judgments that are logical arguments about the truth (or, equivalently,
proof) of a proposition. They might, optionally, involve assumptions about
the truth (or, equivalently, proof) of other propositions. We call these
logical judgments.
In addition, since a logical judgment might involve a set Γ of assumptions (or
a context), it is convenient to add a third kind of judgment of the form Γ ctx
Thus, in IPL, we get the judgments φ ∈ Prop, φ true and Γ ctx:
φ ∈ Prop φ is a (well-formed) proposition
φ true Proposition φ is true
i.e., has a proof.
Γ ctx Γ is a (well-formed) context of assumptions
The natural deduction system of IPL is given below:
11
Prop Formation
Pi ∈ Prop
Atom
> ∈ Prop
Top
⊥ ∈ Prop
Bottom
φ1 ∈ Prop φ2 ∈ Prop
φ1 ⊃ φ2 ∈ Prop
Arr
φ1 ∈ Prop φ2 ∈ Prop
φ1 ∧ φ2 ∈ Prop
Conj
φ1 ∈ Prop φ2 ∈ Prop
φ1 ∨ φ2 ∈ Prop
Disj
Context Formation
◦ ctx
Nil
Γ ctx φ ∈ Prop
Γ, φ true ctx
Γ-Ext
Context Reflection
Γ ctx φ true ∈ Γ
Γ ` φ true
Γ-Refl
Top Introduction – Bottom Elimination
Γ ` > true
>I
Γ ` ⊥ true
Γ ` φ true
⊥E
12
Implication Introduction and Elimination
Γ, φ1 true ` φ2 true
Γ ` φ1 ⊃ φ2 true
⊃I
Γ ` φ1 ⊃ φ2 true Γ ` φ1 true
Γ ` φ2 true
⊃E
Conjunction Introduction and Elimination
Γ ` φ1 true Γ ` φ2 true
Γ ` φ1 ∧ φ2 true
∧I
Γ ` φ1 ∧ φ2 true
Γ ` φ1 true
∧El
Γ ` φ1 ∧ φ2 true
Γ ` φ2 true
∧Er
Disjunction Introduction and Elimination
Γ ` φ1 true
Γ ` φ1 ∨ φ2 true
∨Il
Γ ` φ2 true
Γ ` φ1 ∨ φ2 true
∨Ir
Γ ` φ1 ∨ φ2 true Γ, φ1 true ` φ true Γ, φ2 true ` φ true
Γ ` φ true
∨E
2.2.1 Basic Properties of Intuitionistic Entailment
13
Reflexivity
Γ, φ true ` φ true
Transitivity
Γ ` ψ true Γ, ψ true ` φ true
Γ, φ true ` φ true
Contraction
Γ, φ true, φ true ` ψ true
Γ, φ true ` ψ true
Exchange
Γ ` φ true
pi(Γ) ` φ true
Where pi(Γ) is a meta-symbol standing for any permutation of Γ.
14
2.3 Order Theoretic Semantics: Heyting Al-
gebras
IPL viewed order theoretically gives rise to a Heyting Algebra(HA). To define
HA we need the notion of a lattice. For our purposes we define it as follows1:
Definition: A lattice is a non-empty pre-order with finite meets and
joins.
In addition, we define bounded lattice as follows:
Definition: A bounded lattice (L,≤) is a lattice that additionally has a
greatest element 1 and a least element 0, which satisfy
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 for every x in L
Finally, we can define HA:
Definition: A HA is a bounded lattice (L,≤, 0, 1) s.t. for every a, b ∈ L
there exists an x (we name it a→ b) with the properties:
1. a ∧ x ≤ b
2. x is the greatest such element
Axiomatization of HAs
We can axiomatize the meet (i.e. greatest lower bound)(∧) of φ, ψ for any
lower bound χ.
1One can take a lattice being a partial order. The same results hold with slight
modifications.
15
φ ∧ ψ ≤ φ φ ∧ ψ ≤ ψ
χ ≤ φ χ ≤ ψ
χ ≤ φ ∧ ψ
We can axiomatize the join (∨)(i.e. the least upper bound) of φ, ψ for any
upper bound χ as follows .
φ ≤ φ ∨ ψ ψ ≤ φ ∨ ψ
φ ≤ χ ψ ≤ χ
φ ∨ ψ ≤ χ
We can axiomatize the existence of a greatest element as follows:
χ ≤ 1
which says that 1 is the greatest element.
We can axiomatize the existence of a least element as follows:
0 ≤ χ
which says that 0 is the least element.
Finally, to axiomatize HAs we require the existence of exponentials for every
φ, ψ as follows:
16
φ ∧ (φ ⊃ ψ) ≤ ψ
φ ∧ χ ≤ ψ
χ ≤ φ ⊃ ψ
Soundness and Completeness
Theorem. Γ `IPL φ true iff for any Heyting Algebra H we have Γ+ ≤ φ∗
where ∗ is defined as the lifting of any map of Props to elements of H
and (+) is defined inductively on the length of Γ as follows
◦+ = >
(Γ, φ)+ = Γ+ ∧ φ∗
Chapter 3
Typed Lambda Calculus
3.1 From Intuitionistic Provability to Proof
Trees
IPL can be viewed as a declarative axiomatization of proof constructs. Take
the introduction rule for conjunction as an example:
Γ ` A true Γ ` B true
Γ ` A ∧B true
∧I
The rule says, “given the existence a proof of A and a proof of B from
assumptions Γ, there exists a proof of A ∧B from assumptions Γ at hand ”.
We used the description “declarative” because in this format IPL sequents
Γ ` true do not describe how such existentials are realized. It is in essence a
17
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logic of “proof relevant truth” but it does not involve the proofs themselves
as first class objects.
An alternative presentation is to explicate proof constructs by directly
providing a system of “proof trees”. Such an approach was actually champi-
oned in Gentzen’s natural deduction systems and is the necessary move to
obtain proof calculi. Once we have explicit proof objects (either as trees, or as
we will see, as terms) the system is enriched with equality principles involving
such objects. Such rules give computational value (“proof dynamics”) to
the constructs and drive the idea of “Curry–Howard Isomorphism” and its
extensions. We will provide such a formulation in proof trees of judgments
together with the equality rules on trees, essentially following Gentzen.
Proof trees of judgments have the following shape:
J1, . . . , Ji
···
J
We focus on judgments J of the form A true. Here are the the rules for
19
constructing proof trees with labeled assumptions1.
x1 : A1 true, . . . , xi : Ai true
...
Aj∈1...i true
x1 : A1 true, . . . , xi : Ai true
...
> true
D
A true
E
B true
A ∧B true
D
A ∧B true
A true
D
A ∧B true
B true
x : A
D
B true
A ⊃ B true
D
A ⊃ B true
E
A true
B true
1Strictly speaking the constructs are directed acyclic graphs and not trees since assump-
tions with the same label are bound and substitutable together but we will be cavalier
with such a detail
20
D
A true
A ∨B true
D
B true
A ∨B true
D
A ∨B true
A true
E
C true
B true
F
C true
C true
D
⊥ true
C true
3.1.1 Properties of Intuitionistic Entailment Redux
Proof trees by their nature satisfy the properties of entailment in 2.2.1. We
will not bother with reflection and contraction. The first is trivial and the
second can be shown by simple induction on the structure of trees; the proof
is highlighting that reflection on hypothesis is order-irrelevant. Transitivity
is established by compositionality of proof trees and reflects the essence of
hypothetical reasoning: proof trees of the appropriate proposition can be
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“plugged in” for assumptions to create new, well-formed trees.
Theorem. If
x : A
D
B true
and
E
A true
are valid proof trees,
their composition denoted as:
E
A true
D
B true
and defined by substituting all occurrences of x : A for E in D, is a valid
proof tree for B true.
3.1.2 Equating Proof Trees
Having proof objects as first class citizens, permits for developing logics,
essentially, as theories of (typed) equality among such objects. This idea
stemmed from Gentzen’s work on natural deduction and cut elimination and
it is what gives proofs computational content. Following are the proposed
equalities for the proof relevant IPL introduced initially by Gentzen as the
driver of the proof cut elimination. We will be revisiting these very same
equalities and reframing them as equalities among proof terms in the next
section. Nevertheless, they originated in proof tree form. We show indicatively
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the equalities regarding the ⊃,∧ connectives reserving the rest for the more
concise proof-term notation.
x : A
D
B true
A ⊃ B true
E
A true
B true
=β
E
A true
D
B true
D
A ⊃ B true =η
D
A ⊃ B true x : A
B true
A ⊃ B
D
A true
E
B true
A ∧B true
A true
=β
D
A true
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D
A true
E
B true
A ∧B true
B true
=β
E
B true
D
A ∧B true =η
D
A ∧B true
A true
D
A ∧B true
B true
A ∧B
3.2 Linear Representation of Trees with Proof
Terms: λ Calculus
Proof terms provide an alternative, linear representation for proof trees. The
simply typed lambda calculus and its equational system can, thus, be viewed
as a calculus for proof trees and proof reductions for intuitionistic logic.
What’s more, following the doctrine of proof relevance and of characterizing
connectives by their proof reductions, i.e. working in the realm of Curry–
Howard Isomorphism, we hit two birds with one stone: we both develop
proof relevant logics and we get typed programming languages that reflect
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their computational content. The “simplest” language obtained within this
program is the simply typed lambda calculus, but we will see that the same
doctrine extends to different logics with different judgmental constructs.
Simply typed lambda calculus
Type Formation
Pi ∈ Type
Atom
> ∈ Type
Top
⊥ ∈ Type
Bottom
A ∈ Type B ∈ Type
A→ B ∈ Type
Arr
A ∈ Type B ∈ Type
A×B ∈ Type
Prod
A ∈ Type B ∈ Type
A+B ∈ Type
Union
Context Formation
nil ctx
Nil
Γ ctx A ∈ Type x fresh in Γ
Γ, x : A ctx
Γ-Add
Context Reflection
Γ ctx x : A ∈ Γ
Γ ` x : A
Γ-Refl
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Top Introduction – Bottom Elimination
Γ ` 〈〉 : >
>I
Γ `M : ⊥
Γ ` abort[A](M) : A
⊥E
Function Construction and Application
Γ, x : A `M : B
Γ ` λx : A. M : A→ B
λ−Abs
Γ `M : A→ B Γ `M ′ : A
Γ ` (MM ′) : B
App
Tuple Construction and Projections
Γ `M : A Γ `M ′ : B
Γ ` 〈M,M ′〉 : A×B
Tup
Γ `M : A×B
Γ ` fst(M) : A
LPrj
Γ `M : A×B
Γ ` snd(M) : B
RPrj
Union Construction and Elimination
Γ `M : A
Γ ` injl[B](M) : A+B
InjL
Γ `M : B
Γ ` injr[A](M) : A+B
InjR
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Γ `M : A+B Γ, x : A ` N : C Γ, y : B ` O : C
Γ ` case M of injl[B](x) 7−→ N | injr[A](y) 7−→ O : C
∨E
3.2.1 Definitional Equality: Proof Tree Equality as Term
Equality
Gentzen’s principles transliterate to an equational system for terms. In the
following we are defining a congruence relation on proof terms which is usually
coined as definitional equality and denoted M = M ′ : A. We want definitional
equality = to be the least congruence closed under the β, η rules that directly
reflect Gentzen’s principles in term form.
Definition A congruence is
• an equivalence relation (i.e. reflexive, symmetric and transitive)
• that commutes with operators E.g.
Γ `M = M ′ : A
Γ ` fst(M) = fst(M ′) : A
Informally , we should be able to replace “equals with equals” everywhere
in a term.
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Local Soundness
Local soundness captures the idea that “elimination rules are not too strong”,
which is the informal notion that the elimination rules should cancel the
introduction rules and give nothing new. The so-called β equality rules are
as follows:
Γ `M : A Γ ` N : B
Γ ` fst(〈M,N〉) = M : A
β∧1
Γ `M : A Γ ` N : B
Γ ` snd(〈M,N〉) = N : B
β∧2
Γ, x : A `M : B Γ ` N : A
Γ ` (λx : A. M)(N) = [N/x]M : B
β ⊃
Γ, x : A ` N : C Γ, y : B ` O : C Γ ` P : A
Γ ` (case injl[B](P ) of injl[B](x) 7−→ N | injr[A](y) 7−→ O) = [P/x]N : C
Γ, x : A ` N : C Γ, y : B ` O : C Γ ` Q : B
Γ ` (case injr[A](Q) of injl[B](x) 7−→ N | injr[A](y) 7−→ O) = [Q/y]O : C
Local completeness
Local completeness on the other hand captures the idea that “elimination
rules are not too weak”. Given any proof of a specific type one should be able
to reintroduce it by extracting its constituents via elimination rules. Another
way to see this is that canonical forms of a certain type structure should have
28
certain shape.
The η rules (a.k.a. identity expansion) are given below. We assume that
in the η → case the variable x does not appear free in the term M :
Γ `M : >
Γ `M = 〈 〉 : >
η>
Γ `M : A×B
Γ `M = 〈fst(M), snd(M)〉 : A×B
η×
Γ `M : A→ B
Γ `M = λx : A.Mx : A→ B
η →
Γ `M : A+B
Γ `M = case M of | injl[B](x) 7→ injl[B](x)
injr[A](y) 7→ injr[A](y) : A+B
η∨
3.3 Operational (a.k.a “term”) Semantics
It is obvious that the system is consistent in terms of provability. It’s forgetful
projection is exactly IPL for which we have provided order-theoretic models.
We would like to show consistency for the proof relevant model. One way is
operational semantics. We will be discussing only the →, ∧ fragment.
The first step toward operational semantics is to break the symmetry of
the definitional equivalence and construct a one-way reduction relation on
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lambda terms. Towards this definition we first define the notion of a redex2:
Definition. • A β-redex is every term of the form:
(λx : A.N)M | fst(〈M,N〉)| snd(〈M,N〉)
• An η-redex is every term of the form:
λx : A.Mx|〈fstM, sndM〉
A normal form is a term where no redex occurs. To make the term surrounding
the redex explicit, we can use a term context, i.e. a term with a single term
hole, such as λx : A.[•], (e[•]), [•]e, where a hole can be substituted for a term
to give a larger term. To be strict all single hole terms have the following
diagram:
H := [•]| (M [•])| ([•]M)| λx : A.H| 〈H,M〉| 〈M,H〉
Now we have enough tools to define the (one-step) βη-reduction between
two terms that include redexes as follows:
One-step 7→βη reduction
(λx : A.N)M 7→ [M/x]N (β)
2we only present it for the × → part of the calculus
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fst〈M,N〉 7→M (β) snd〈M,N〉 7→ N (β)
λx : Mx 7→M (η) 〈fstM, sndM〉 7→M (η)
M 7→M ′
H[M ] 7→ H[M ′ ]
(subterm)
Now we can define the reflexive, transitive closure of the previous relation
as 7→∗βη to denote zero or more reduction steps. The following facts – leading
to a computational proof of consistency – hold:
Theorem. Church–Rosser for 7→βη For every term M , if M 7→βη N1
and M 7→βη N2 then there exists N ′ s.t. N1 7→ N ′ and N2 7→ N ′
Theorem. Church–Rosser for 7→∗βη For every term M , if M 7→∗βη N1
and M 7→∗βη N2 then there exists N ′ s.t. N1 7→∗βη N ′ and N2 7→∗βη N ′
The first consistency result for the equational system comes straight from the
Church–Rosser properties. Since it is easy to show that for any terms M , N s.t.
Γ `M = N : A, based on the = axiomatization, there exists a finite sequence
of terms N0, . . . , Ni such that M 7→∗βη N0 ←[∗βη N1 7→∗βη N2 ←[∗βη . . . ←[βη Ni.
Now we can obtain:
Theorem. Definitional equality implies common contractum For
any terms, M ,N if Γ ` M = N : A then there exists term L s.t.
M,N 7→∗βη L
And as a result:
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Theorem. Consistency of definitional equality of terms The defi-
nitional equality = is not trivial i.e. it won’t equate any two terms.
Moving toward consistency of the whole system (i.e. there is not term of type
⊥), we prove a theorem for the existence of normal forms.
Theorem. Weak normalization theorem For any term M , there
exists a finite sequence of terms s.t. M 7→β N0 7→β N1 7→β N2 7→β . . . 7→β
Ni where Ni is a β normal form.
It is common place in metatheoretic proofs for such systems that induction
on the structure of the term does not “go through”. Intuitively, a reduction
can be “enlarging” the term yet, it is doing progress based on a different kind
of metric. The idea is that we can choose a reduction strategy such that the
number of redexes of a specific type (to be defined soon) reduce. Here are the
steps towards the proof. We omit redexes related to disjunction but the proof
extends to such cases pretty easily.
Definition The degree of a type A is defined as follows:
• θ(Pi) = 1 if Pi is atomic
• θ(A×B) = θ(A→ B) = θ(A) + θ(B) + 1
Definition The degree of a redex is defined as follows:
• Given that the type of λx.M is of type A → B then d((λx.M)N) =
θ(A→ B)
• Similarly, d(fst〈M,N〉) = θ(A×B) where A×B is the type of 〈M,N〉
32
• Similarly for the other kinds of redexes.
Definition The degree of a term d(t) is defined as the supremum of the
degrees of its redexes.
Now we can prove the following facts:
Theorem. 1. The degree of redex r is strictly larger than the degree of
its type A: θ(A) < d(r)
2. The degree of a redex (r) seen as term (t) is smaller or equal to its
redex degree (as a term) since the whole term might include other
redexes: d(r) ≤ d(t).
3. The term resulting from a substitutionM [N/x] has degree : d(M [N/x]) ≤
max(d(M), d(N), θ(A)) where A is the declared type of x in the type
context.
Theorem. If M 7→M ′ then d(M) < d(N) and hence, if M 7→+ N then
d(M) < d(N).
As a result we get a weak normalization theorem by induction on pairs
(d(M), k) where k is the number of redexes with degree d(M).
Theorem. Weak Normalization Theorem For every term Γ `M : A
there exists a normalization strategy such that M 7→∗β N and N is a
normal form.
Combining with previous results we get:
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Theorem. Consistency There is no (closed) term M for which `M : ⊥
Suppose the opposite and obtain a contradiction using the previous theorem;
there is no way to obtain a normal form of a bottom type from the rules.
A stronger result is the strong normalization theorem which states that
every strategy is normalizing. This result is relevant to concurrent imple-
mentations of reduction since it implies that the order in which redexes are
consumed does not matter during the evaluation of expression.
The important idea behind the technique – that generalizes to proof of
strong normalization for more complex calculi – is the concept of reducibility
predicates (see, e.g. [46]).
3.3.1 The Essence of Proofs-as-Programs
The proofs of normalization above are essentially of the same “proof strength”
as the logical proof of cut elimination. In a nutshell, eliminating cuts is the
same as normalizing proof terms (or, correspondingly, proof trees).
In reality, the slogan of the Curry–Howard isomorphism and, in general,
of a type theoretic treatment to logic should be “Normalization as Cut
Elimination”. This aspect of the isomorphism can be articulated nicely
following Sieg’s extraction method [47], which showcases how a construction
of a Cut-free sequent calculus comes naturally from an analysis of normal
proofs in natural deduction.
Chapter 4
Justification Logic
In this chapter, I will give an overview of JL. I will emphasize LP, the very
first logic of justification, and its deep relation with IPL. My scaffolding will
be based upon [6], [5] that reflect this relation. Beforehand, I will allow for a
more general discussion on JL following [3] and other relevant papers.
4.1 A bird’s eye view
According to [3]“Justification logics are epistemic logics which allow knowl-
edge and belief modalities to be “unfolded” into justification terms.” More
specifically, in JL the modality in question is witnessed by a reason and propo-
sitions of the kind φ become t : φ that reads “φ is justified by reason t”.
Witnesses in JL have structure and operations. Different choices of operators
result in logics that explicate different modalities (K, T , S4, S5). In general,
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there is an infinite family of justification logics. For our purposes, and in
addition to type theoretic approaches to logic, JL reveals a computational
content for validity in classical terms. As we will see following [1], JL and
especially its S4 counterpart The Logic of Proofs (LP), can provide a unified
classical semantics for type theoretic formulations of intuitionistic logic. In
addition, following [7, 44], JL mechanics can be viewed type theoretically
to provide for modal typed systems that enrich computational type theories
with “semantical” notions such as explicit reflection and modular binding.
4.2 Minimal Justification Logic J0
To permit for an account of reasons, the logic is enriched with an extra
sort (j) for justifications. The sort of propositions is then enriched with
propositions of the kind j : φ with φ being a proposition. The abstract syntax
is as follows:
j :=si| Ci|j1 ∗ j2|j2 + j2
φ :=Pi| ⊥| φ1 ∧ φ2| φ1 ∨ φ2| φ2 ⊃ φ2| ¬φ| j : φ
Constants Ci are symbols that can be assigned to logic axioms that are
assumed to be necessary. Weaker justification logics exist without any assign-
ment of constants (empty constant specifications) or with partial constant
specifications. Nevertheless, in order for the rule of necessitation to be ad-
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missible each axiom instance of the underlying propositional logic has to be
assigned a constant. We will be coming back to this topic in later sections.
Symbols si stand for variables.
A Hilbert-style axiomatization of J0 is given below. Its components are
Hilbert’s axioms for propositional logic together with two basic rules for
justification: applicativity and concatenation. Concatenation internalizes
weakening of proofs.
Propositional Axioms
P1. ` φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ φ)
P2. ` (φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ χ)) ⊃ ((φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ χ))
P3. ` φ ⊃ ψ ⊃ φ ∧ ψ
P4. ` φ ⊃ ψ ⊃ ψ ∧ φ
P5. ` φ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ
P6. ` ψ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ
P7. ` (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (¬ψ ⊃ ¬φ)
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Justification Axioms
Times. ` j : (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (j′ : φ ⊃ j ∗ j′ : ψ)
PlusL. ` j : φ ⊃ (j + j′ : φ)
PlusR. ` j : φ ⊃ (j′ + j : φ)
The rule of the system is Modus Ponens.
Modus Ponens
φ ⊃ ψ φ
ψ
MP
For the rule of necessitation to be admissible, we need necessitation of axioms
to be admissible. For that reason a constant specification is required. We
focus here on axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS because of
its relation to combinatorial calculi. An axiomatization of axiomatically ap-
propriate CS given below. Elements of CS are pairs (C, φ) of polymorphic (i.e.
parametrized over propositions) constants and propositions. The ! operator
relates to a concept of internalization of justified statements, i.e. witnessing
the existence of a justified statement with a (higher order) justification. We
demand that all justified axiomatic schemes can be internalized.
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Axiomatic CS
` (C1[φ, ψ], φ→ (ψ → φ)) ∈ CS
C1
` (C2[φ, ψ, χ], (φ ⊃ (ψ ⊃ χ)) ⊃ ((φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ χ)))) ∈ CS
C2
` (C3[φ, ψ], φ ⊃ ψ ⊃ φ ∧ ψ) ∈ CS
C3
` (C4[φ, ψ], φ ⊃ ψ ⊃ ψ ∧ φ) ∈ CS
C4
` (C5[φ, ψ], φ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ) ∈ CS
C5
` (C6[φ, ψ], ψ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ) ∈ CS
C6
` (C7[φ, ψ], (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (¬ψ ⊃ ¬φ) ∈ CS
C7
` (C8[φ, ψ, j, j′], j : (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (j′ : φ ⊃ j ∗ j′ : ψ)) ∈ CS
C8
` (C, φ) ∈ CS
` (C!, C : φ) ∈ CS
C!
Finally we require reflection on CS:
Specification Reflection
` (C, φ) ∈ CS
` C : φ
CSR
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The system can be given a Natural Deduction formulation a` la IPL since
the following theorem holds:
Deduction Theorem For any set of propositional assumptions Γ,
Γ, φ ` ψ implies Γ ` φ ⊃ ψ
4.3 Epistemic motivation
JL as an epistemic logic departs from previous traditions of logic of knowledge
based on universality judgments. From [3]
The modal approach to the logic of knowledge is, in a sense,
built around the universal quantifier: X is known in a situation if
X is true in all situations indistinguishable from that one. Justifi-
cations, on the other hand, bring an existential quantifier into the
picture: X is known in a situation if there exists a justification
for X in that situation
This fresh approach to the epistemic tradition has been utilized to solve
many problems in formal epistemology (see [4]). We sketch here the solution
to the famous Red barn problem that, also, provides a pedagogical example
on how deduction in the system works.
The red barn problem can be stated as follows:
Suppose I am driving through a neighborhood in which, unbe-
knownst to me, papier-maˆche´ barns are scattered, and I see that
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the object in front of me is a barn. Because I have barn-before-me
percepts, I believe that the object in front of me is a barn. Our
intuitions suggest that I fail to know barn. But now suppose that
the neighborhood has no fake red barns, and I also notice that the
object in front of me is red, so I know a red barn is there. This
juxtaposition, being a red barn, which I know, entails there being
a barn, which I do not, “is an embarrassment”
The red barn example can be represented in a system of modal logic where
φ represents knowledge of φ that, in contrast to the the justified approach,
is forgetful with respect to reasons. The formalization and the accompanying
problem go as follows:
1. B, ‘I believe that the object in front of me is a red barn’.
2. (B ∧R), ‘I believe that the object in front of me is a red barn’.
At the metalevel, 2 is actually knowledge, whereas by the problem descrip-
tion, 1 is not knowledge.
3. (B ∧R ⊃ B), a knowledge assertion of a logical axiom.
Within this formalization, it appears that epistemic closure in its
modal form (2) is violated:line 2, (B∧R), and line 3, (B∧R ⊃ B)
are cases of knowledge whereas B (line 1) is not knowledge. The
modal language here does not seem to help resolving this issue.
Of course, one can resolve this by introducing a second modality(e.g. for “I
believe that”). But then similar problems can occur (e.g. by adding a third
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modality read as ‘it should be’). Indexing of modalities with reasons solves
this problem in its generality: by permitting the applicative closure only on
reasons of the same sort one can overcome this defect.
1. u : B, ‘u is a reason to believe that the object in front of me is a barn’;
2. v : (B ∧R), ‘v is a reason to believe that the object in front of me is a red
barn’;
3. a : (B ∧R ⊃ B), because of logical awareness.
On the metalevel, the problem description states that 2 and 3 are cases
of knowledge, and not merely belief, whereas 1 is belief which is not
knowledge. The formal reasoning goes as follows:
4. a : (B ∧R ⊃ B) ⊃ (v : (B ∧R) ⊃ a ∗ v : B), by Times
5. v : (B ∧ R) ⊃ a ∗ v : B, from 3 and 4, by propositional logic; a ∗ v : B,
from 2 and 5, by propositional logic.
4.4 Proof theoretic view
In Chapter 2 we gave an analytic account of the BHK principles of con-
structive proofs. In the paper “Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen
Aussagenkalku¨ls ”, Go¨edel gave a classical provability interpretation of BHK
using the modal system S4.
The standard axiomatization of S4 is given below:
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The system S4
P1− P7
K. ` (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)
T. ` φ ⊃ φ
4. ` φ ⊃ φ
Modus Ponens
φ ⊃ ψ φ
ψ
MP
Go¨edel’s result can be summarized in the following theorem:
Go¨del-Tarski Translation of Intuitionistic Logic
Γ `IPL φ ⇁ Γ `S4 tr(φ)
where tr(φ) is obtained by φ by -ing its subformulas.
After this result the state of the project of a classical interpretation of
BHK semantics was as follows: IPC ↪→ S4 ↪→ ? ↪→ CLASSICAL PROOFS.
Filling the missing part was the motivation behind LP, the first Justification
Logic.
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4.5 The Logic of Proofs
An axiomatization of LP with axiomatically appropriate constant specification
as defined in 4.2 can be given as follows:
The system LP
P1− P7
Times. ` j : (φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (j′ : φ ⊃ j ∗ j′ : ψ)
PlusL. ` j : φ ⊃ (j + j′ : φ)
PlusR. ` j : φ ⊃ (j′ + j : φ)
T. ` j : φ ⊃ φ
4. ` j : φ ⊃ (j! : j : φ)
4.6 Metatheoretic Results
The Deduction Theorem holds for LP
Deduction Theorem Any deduction of the kind Γ, φ ` ψ implies Γ `
φ ⊃ ψ.
Also, the lifting property can be obtained:
Lifting Lemma
Any deduction of the kind ~j : Γ,∆ ` φ implies ~j : Γ, ~s : ∆ `
j′(~j, ~s) : φ where ~j is a vector metavariables to be substituted for arbitrary
44
polynomials and ~s is a vector of (object) variables.
In addition, LP is the forgetful projection of S4. More specifically, consider a
formula of LP φ and the transformation F(φ) that replaces all subformulae
of φ of the kind j : φ′ with φ′. The following theorem holds:
Forgetful Projection Property
Γ `LP φ implies Γ `S4 F(φ)
The inverse also holds as the realization theorem says. Before introducing
the realization procedure we give a motivating example.
Example: Realization of `S4 φ ∨ψ ⊃ (φ ∨ ψ)
1. φ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ, ψ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ Prop. Axioms;
2. C : (φ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ), C ′ : (ψ ⊃ φ ∨ ψ) From CS rules.
3. s : φ ⊃ C ∗ s : φ ∨ ψ, From 1,2 andTimes and MP
4. t : ψ ⊃ C ′ ∗ t : φ ∨ ψ, Similarly
5. C∗s : φ∨ψ ⊃ (C∗s+C ′∗t) : φ∨ψ and C ′∗t : φ∨ψ ⊃ (C∗s+C ′∗t) : φ∨ψ,
From Rplus, Lplus
6. s : φ ⊃ (C ∗ s+ C ′ ∗ t) : φ ∨ ψ, From 3,5 by Propositional Logic.
7. t : ψ ⊃ (C ∗ s+ C ′ ∗ t) : φ ∨ ψ, From 4,5 by Propositional Logic.
8. s : φ ∨ t : ψ ⊃ (C ∗ s + C ′ ∗ t) : φ ∨ ψ, From 6,7 and Propositional
Logic.
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4.6.1 Realization
The realization theorem gives an algorithmic process for transforming cut-free
deductions inS4 to LP. By an LP-realization of a modal formula φ we mean
an assignment of proof polynomials to all occurrences of the modality inφ.
Let φr be the image of φ under a realization r.
The polarity of s in a formula is relevant in realizations. We define
positive and negative occurrences of modality in a formula and a sequent.
 Polarities
1. The indicated occurrence of  in φ is of positive polarity;
2. any occurrence of  in the subformula φ of ψ ⊃ φ,ψ ∧ φ, φ∧ ψ, ψ ∨ φ,
φ ∨ ψ, φ,Γ⇒ ∆, φ – we will be defining ⇒ momentarily – has the
same polarity as the same occurrence of  in φ.
3. any occurrence of  in the subformula φ of ¬φ, φ ⊃ ψ, Γ, φ⇒ ∆, has
polarity opposite to the polarity of the very same occurrence of  in
φ.
Next we give a a cut-free sequent formulation of S4 (reference) with
sequents Γ ` ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets of modal formulas. The
left hand multisets are to be read conjunctively and the right hand ones
disjunctively. The rules are the rules given below together with the typical
structural ones.
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Γ, φ ` φ,∆
Refl
Γ ` φ,∆
Γ,¬φ ` ∆
¬L
φ,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ¬φ,∆
¬R
Γ, φ, ψ ` ∆
Γ, φ ∧ ψ ` ∆
∧L
Γ ` φ,∆ Γ ` ψ,∆
Γ ` φ ∧ ψ,∆
∧L
Γ, φ ` ∆ Γ, ψ ` ∆
Γ, φ ∨ ψ ` ∆
∨L
Γ ` φ, ψ,∆
Γ ` φ ∨ ψ,∆
∨R
Γ ` φ,∆ Γ, ψ ` ∆
Γ, φ ⊃ ψ ` ∆
⊃L
Γ, φ ` ψ,∆
Γ ` φ ⊃ ψ,∆
⊃R
φ,Γ ` ∆
φ,Γ ` ∆
L
Γ ` φ
Γ ` φ
R
Relevant in the realization proof is the sequent formulation of LP, the
system LPG which enjoys the cut-elimination property resulting in the system
LPG−. The rules relevant to justifications are given below.
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Γ, φ ` φ,∆
Γ, t : φ ` φ,∆
:L
Γ ` t : φ,∆
Γ `!t : t : φ,∆
!R
Γ ` t : φ,∆
Γ ` (t+ s) : φ,∆
+L
Γ ` t : φ,∆
Γ ` (s+ t) : φ,∆
+R
Γ ` s : φ ⊃ ψ,∆ Γ ` t : φ,∆
Γ ` s ∗ t : ψ,∆
∗R
Γ ` φ,∆
Γ ` c : φ,∆
cR
Utilizing the previous systems the realization theorem shows:
Realization Theorem If Γ `S4 φ then there is a normal realization s.t.
Γ `LP φr. By normal we mean a realization for which all occurrences
of  are realized by proof variables and the corresponding constant
specification is injective.
4.6.2 Kripke - Fitting Semantics
In this section I will be discussing Kripke – Fitting Semantics[18] for Justifi-
cation Logic J0 + CS very briefly.
A possible world justification logic model for the system J0 + CS is a
structure M = 〈G,R,E, V 〉. 〈G,R〉 is a standard K frame, where G is a set
of possible worlds and R is a binary relation on it. V is a mapping from
propositional variables to subsets of G, specifying atomic truth at possible
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worlds. E is an evidence function that maps pairs of justification terms and
formulas to sets of worlds.
Given such a model, we define the |= relation as follows:
∀Γ ∈ G
M,Γ |= P iff Γ ∈ V (P ) for P a propositional letter
• It is not the case that M,Γ |= ⊥
• M,Γ |= φ ⊃ ψ iff it is not the case that M,Γ |= φ orM,Γ |= Y
• M,Γ |= (j : φ) if and only if Γ ∈ E(j, φ) and, ∀∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆, we
have that M,∆ |= φ.
The following conditions on evidence functions are assumed:
E(j, φ ⊃ ψ) ∩ E(j′, φ) ⊆ E(j ∗ j′, ψ)
E(j, φ) ∪ E(j′, φ) ⊆ E(j + j′, φ)
Finally, the Constant Specification CS should be taken into account. Recall
that constants are intended to represent reasons for basic assumptions that are
accepted outright. A model M = 〈G,R,E, V 〉 meets Constant Specification
CS provided: if (C, φ) ∈ CS then E(c, φ) = G.
Typical, soundness and completeness results can be shown for such models.
They can also be extended for all other justification logics.
Chapter 5
Curry–Howard view of
Justification Logic
In this and the subsequent chapters we suggest reading a constructive necessity
of a formula (A) as internalizing a notion of constructive truth of A (a
proof within a deductive system I) and a validation of A (a proof under an
interpretation JAKJ within some system J). An example of such a relation is
provided by the simply typed lambda calculus (as I) and its implementation
in SK combinators (as J). We utilize justification logic to axiomatize the
notion of validity-under-interpretation and, hence, treat a “semantical” notion
in a purely proof-theoretic manner. We present the system in Gentzen-style
natural deduction formulation and provide reduction and expansion rules for
the  connective. Finally, we add proof-terms and proof-term equalities to
obtain a corresponding calculus (Jcalc) in the next chapter. The obtained
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system can be viewed as an extension of the Curry–Howard isomorphism
with justifications. We provide standard metatheoretic results and suggest
a programming language interpretation in languages with foreign function
interfaces (FFI s).
5.1 Introduction: Necessity and Constructive
Semantics
In his seminal “Explicit Provability and Constructive Semantics” [2] Artemov
developed a constructive, proof-theoretic semantics for BHK proofs [51] in
what turned out to be the first development of a family of logics that we now
call justification logic. The general idea, upon which we build our calculus, is
that any notion of semantics for a deductive system I involves mappings of
proof constructs of I into another proof system J (which we call justifications)
and can, thus, be viewed in a solely proof-theoretic manner. As an example
one could think of I being Heyting arithmetic and J some “stronger” system
(e.g. a classical axiomatization of Peano arithmetic, a classical or intuitionistic
set theory etc). In Artemov’s work I is assumed to be based on intuitionistic
logic and J on classical logic. We, initially, mute such assumptions to focus
exclusively on the mechanics of necessity in this framework. We recover them
later and study their relation to the Rule of Necessitation for our system.
What’s more, such a semantic relation can be treated logically giving rise to
a modality of explicit necessity. Different sorts of necessity have been offered
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explicit counterparts under the umbrella of justification logic. In fact, there
is an infinite family of logics of justification. Some of them have been studied
within a Curry–Howard setting [7]. Our paper focuses on K modality and
should be viewed as the counterpart of [11] with justifications as we explain
in 7.4.
5.1.1 Deductive Systems, Validity and Necessity
Following a framework championed by Lambek [32, 33], let us assume two
deductive systems I (with propositional universe UI , a possibly non-empty
signature of axioms ΣI and an entailment relation ΣI ; Γ `I A) and J (resp.
with UJ , ΣJ and ΣJ ; ∆ `J φ). We will be using Latin letters for the formulae
of I and Greek letters for the formulae of J . We will be omitting the Σ
signatures when they are not relevant.
For the entailment relations of the two systems we require the following
elementary principles1:
1. Reflexivity. In both relations Γ and ∆ are multisets of formulas (contexts)
that enjoy reflexivity:
A ∈ Γ =⇒ Γ `I A
φ ∈ ∆ =⇒ ∆ `J φ
1We are not excluding other connectives but by imposing such minimal requirements
we show that “necessity” () connective can be treated generically and orthogonally of the
presence of other connectives
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2. Compositionality. Both relations are closed under deduction composition:
Γ `I A and Γ′ , A `I B =⇒ Γ,Γ′ `I B
∆ `J φ and ∆′ , φ `J ψ =⇒ ∆,∆′ `J ψ
3. Top. Both systems have a distinguished top formula > for which under
any Γ, ∆:
Γ `I >I and ∆ `J >J
Now we can define:
Definition. Given a deductive system I, an interpretation for I, noted by
J•KJ , is a pair (J, J•K) of a deductive system J together with a (functional)
mapping J•K : UI → UJ on propositions of I into propositions of J extended
to multisets of formulae of UI with the following properties:
1. Top preservation. J>IK = >J
2. Structural interpretation of contexts. For Γ contexts of the form A1, . . . , An:
JΓK = JA1K, . . . , JAnK
(trivially empty contexts map to empty contexts. As in [32] they can be
treated as the > element).
Definition. Given a deductive system I and an interpretation J•KJ for I we
define a corresponding validation of a deduction ΣI ; Γ `I A as a deduction
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ΣJ ; ∆ `J φ in J such that JAK = φ and ∆ = JΓK . We will be writingJΣI ; Γ `I AKJ to denote such a validation.
Definition. Given a deductive system I, we say that an interpretation J•KJ
is logically complete when for all purely logical deductions D (i.e. deductions
that make no use of ΣI) in I there exists2 a corresponding (purely logical)
validation JDK in J . i.e.
∀D. D : Γ `I A =⇒ ∃JDK : JΓ ` AKJ
Examples of triplets (I, J , J•KJ) of logical systems that fall under the
definition above are: any intuitionistic system mapped to a classical one under
the embedding JA ⊃ BK = ¬˜A∨˜B where ¬˜ and ∨˜ are classical connectives,
the opposite direction under double negation translation, an intuitionistic
system mapped to another intuitionistic system (i.e. a mapping of atomic
formulas of I to atomic formulas of J extended naturally to the intuitionistic
connectives or, simply, the identity mapping) etc. A vacuous validation (when
J•KJ maps everything to >) gives another example. Note that we do not
require ”soundness” of the system J since all that is required for K modality
is admissibility of necessitation which is obtained even in the extreme case
2Note, that we require existence but not uniqueness. Nevertheless, if we treat deductive
systems in a proof irrelevant manner as preorders the above definition gives uniqueness
vacuously. In a more refined approach where I and J are viewed as categories of proofs the
above “logical completeness” translates to the requirement that if the set of (purely logical)
arrows HomI(Γ, A) is non empty then HomJ(JΓK, JAKJ) cannot be empty (i.e. that J•KJ
can be extended to a functor). We leave a complete categorical semantics of our logic
for future work but we expect a generalization of the endofunctorial interpretations of K
modality appearing in [11, 30].
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where J proves and, hence, can validate everything.
The main thesis outlined in this chapter is that this notion of “double
proof” (reasoning about proofs that exists in two related systems) provides for
an understanding of necessity in proof theoretic terms. In addition, we argue,
that this is the driver of (at least) the simplest form of necessity (K) that
appears in justification logic (necessity as internalization). We will focus on
the case where I (the propositional part of our logic) is based on the implicative
fragment of intuitionistic logic and show how justification logic provides for an
axiomatization of such logically complete interpretations J•KJ of implicative
intuitionistic logic. In what follows we provide a natural deduction for an
intuitionistic system I (truth), an axiomatization/specification of J•KJ (treated
abstractly as a function symbol on types) and a treatment of basic necessity
that relates the two deductions by internalizing a notion of “double truth”
(proof in I and existence of corresponding validation in J).
5.2 Judgments of Jcalc
We aim for a reading of necessity that internalizes a notion of “double proof”
in two deductive systems. Motivated by the discussion and definitions in the
previous section we will treat the notion of interpretation abstractly – as a
function symbol on types – and axiomatize in accordance. Intuitively we
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want:
A true := A true & A valid = A true in I & JAK true in J
We will be dropping indexes I, J since they can be inferred by the different
kinds of assumption contexts. In addition, we omit signatures Σ since they
do not offer anything from a logical perspective.
Logical entailment for the proposed  connective can be summarized
easily given our previous discussion. Given a deduction D : A ` B and the
existence of validation JDK : JAK ` JBK then given A (i.e. a proof of a
` A and a validation ` JAK) we obtain a double proof of B (and hence, B)
by compositionality of the underlying systems. Using standard, proof tree
notation with labeled assumptions we formulate our rule of the connective in
natural deduction:
....
A
A
x
···
B
JAK s
···JBK
B
IBE
x,s
A
We can, easily, generalize to ed contexts (of the form A1, . . . ,Ai) of
arbitrary length:
....
A1 . . .Ai
Γ′ : A1, . . . Ai
~x
···
B
JΓ′K : JA1K, . . . JAiK ~s
···JBK
B
IBE
~x,~s
A1...Ai
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We read as “Introducing B after eliminating A1 . . .Ai crossing out
(vectors of) labels ~x,~s ”. Interestingly, the same rule eliminates boxes and
introduces new ones. This is not surprising for K modality (it is a left-right
rule as we will see (5.2.4). See also discussion in [11, 12]). We will be referring
to this rule as “ Intro–After–Elim” or, simply IE, from now on.
Note that we define the  connective negatively, yet (pure) introduction
rules for the  connective are derivable. Such are instances of the previous
Intro–After–Elim rule when Γ′ is empty which conforms exactly with the idea
of necessity internalizing double theoremhood.
` B ` JBK
B
IB
In the next section, we provide the whole calculus in natural deduction
format. As expected we will extend the implicational fragment of intuitionistic
logic with
• Judgments about validity (justification logic).
• Judgments that relate truth and validity (modal judgments).
5.2.1 Natural Deduction for Jcalc
The treatment of necessity in the previous section is completely orthogonal to
the underlying systems (it just assumes the basic requirements stated for the
behavior J•K). In this section we will provide a full natural deduction and in
congruence with justification logic we will assume that the underlying system
(I) is a fragment of intuitionistic logic (the ‘negative’ to be precise). The host
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theory J can still remain unspecified, but the choice of I informs for some
specifications ( in order to preserve completeness of logical deductions).
Following type theory conventions, we first provide rules underlying type
construction, then rules for well-formedness of (labeled) assumption contexts
and rules introducing and eliminating connectives. The rules below should
be obvious except for one small caveat. On the one hand, the type universe
of UI and the proof trees of I are inductively defined as usual; on the other
hand, the host theory J (its corresponding universe, connectives and proof
trees) is “black boxed”. What we actually axiomatize are the properties that
all (logic preserving) interpretations of I should conform to, independently of
the specifics of the host theory. Validity judgments should thus be read as
specifications of provability (existence of proofs) of any candidate J .
When we write JΓK ` JφK it reads as there exists derivation D : ∆ `J ψ
s.t. ∆ = JΓK and ψ = JφK). We use Prop0 to denote the type universe of
I and JProp0K to denote its image under an interpretation, Prop1 denotes
modal (“boxed”) types and Prop the union of Prop0,Prop1. We write Pk with
k ranging in some subset of natural numbers to denote atomic propositions
in I.
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Judgments on Type Universe(s)
Pk ∈ Prop0
Atom
> ∈ Prop0
Top
A ∈ Propi B ∈ Propi
A ∧B ∈ Propi
Conj
A ∈ Prop0
A ∈ Prop1
Box
A ∈ Propi B ∈ Propj
A ⊃ B ∈ Propmax(i,j)
Arr
A ∈ Prop0
JAK ∈ JProp0K Brc
For labeled contexts of assumptions we require standard wellformedness
conditions (i.e. uniqueness of labels). We use letters xi, or simply x, for
labels of contexts with assumptions in Prop0, x′i or simply x′ for contexts
with assumptions in Prop1 and si, or simply s, for JProp0K contexts. We
use ◦ and ◦ for the empty context of Prop0 and Prop1 respectively and †
for the empty context of JProp0K. We abuse notation and write x : A ∈ Γ
(or, similarly, s : JAK ∈ ∆) to denote that the label x is assigned type A
in Γ; or Γ ∈ Prop0 instead of Γ ` wf0 (resp. Γ ∈ Prop1, ∆ ∈ JProp0K) to
denote that Γ is a wellformed context with co-domain of elements in Prop0
(resp. in Prop1, JProp0K). For Γ ∈ Prop0 we define JΓK as the lifting of the
context Γ through the J•K symbol (with appropriate renaming of variables –
e.g. xi  si), similarly we define the Γ operation . For the vacuous cases
when Γ is the empty context we require J◦K = † and Γ = ◦to be well
formed.
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Judgments on Context Wellformedness
◦ ` wf0
Nil
Γ ` wf0 A ∈ Prop0 x 6∈ Γ
Γ, x : A ` wf0
Γ-Ext
† = J◦K ` Jwf0K J Nil K
Γ ` wf0
JΓK ` Jwf0K JΓK ◦ ` wf1  Nil
Γ ` wf0
Γ ` wf1
Γ
In the following entry we define proof trees (in turnstile representation)
of the intuitionistic source theory I. For all following rules we assume
Γ, A,B ∈ Prop0:
Judgments on Truth Γ, A,B ∈ Prop0
x : A ∈ Γ
Γ ` A
Γ0-Refl
Γ ` >
>0I
Γ ` A Γ ` B
Γ ` A ∧B
∧0I
Γ ` A ∧B
Γ ` A
∧0E1
Γ ` A ∧B
Γ ` B
∧0E2
Γ, x : A ` B
Γ ` A ⊃ B
⊃0I
Γ ` A ⊃ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
⊃0E
For the calculus of interpretation (validity) we demand context reflexiv-
ity, compositionality and logical completeness with respect to intuitionistic
implication. Logical completeness is specified axiomatically, since the host
theory is “black boxed”. Following justification logic, we use an axiomatic
characterization of combinatory logic (for ⊃) together with the requirement
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that the interpretation preserves modus ponens:
Judgments on Validity with ∆ ∈ JProp0K
s : JAK ∈ ∆
∆ ` JAK ∆-Refl ∆ ` J>K Ax1
A,B ∈ Prop0
∆ ` JA ⊃ (B ⊃ A)K Ax2
A,B,C ∈ Prop0
∆ ` JA ⊃ (B ⊃ C) ⊃ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C))K Ax3
A,B ∈ Prop0
∆ ` JA ⊃ (B ⊃ A ∧B)K Ax4
A,B ∈ Prop0
∆ ` JA ∧B ⊃ AK Ax5
A,B ∈ Prop0
∆ ` JA ∧B ⊃ BK Ax6
∆ ` JA ⊃ BK ∆ ` JAK
∆ ` JBK MP
Finally, we have judgments in the ed universe (Prop1). These are
context reflection, the  Intro-After-Elim rule, and the rules for intuitionistic
implication between ed types 3.
3The implication and elimination rules in Prop1 actually coincide with the ones in Prop0
since we are focusing on the case where I is intuitionistic. This need not necessarily be
the case as we have explained. Intuitionistic implication among  types should be read
as “double proof of A implies double proof of B” and would still be defined even if we
did not observe any kind of implication in I. Similarly, one could provide intuitionistic
conjunction or disjunction between  types independently of I and, vice versa, one could
add connectives in I that are not observed between ed types.
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Judgments on Necessity with
Γ ∈ Prop1, length(Γ) = i, 1 ≤ k ≤ i and, Γ′, A,Ak, B ∈ Prop0
x′ : A ∈ Γ
Γ ` A
Γ1-Refl
(∀Ai ∈ Γ′. Γ ` Ai) Γ′ ` B JΓ′K ` JBK
Γ ` B
IBE
~x,~s
A1...Ai
Γ, x′ : A ` B
Γ ` A ⊃ B
⊃1I
Γ ` A ⊃ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
⊃1E
(Pure) I as derivable rule
We stress here that  can be introduced positively with the previous rule with
Γ′ = ◦. The first premise reduces to a simple requirement that Γ ∈ Prop1.
◦ ` A † ` JAK
Γ ` A
IA
A simple derivation
We show here that the K axiom of modal logic is a theorem (omitting some
obvious steps). In the following
Γ := x′1 : (A ⊃ B), x′2 : A, Γ′ = x1 : A ⊃ B, x2 : A, JΓ′K = s1 : JA ⊃ BK, s2 : JAK
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Γ ` (A ⊃ B) Γ ` A Γ′ ` B JΓ′K ` JBK
(A ⊃ B),A ` B
IAE
x1,x2,s1,s2
A⊃B,A
(A ⊃ B) ` A ⊃ B
⊃1I
◦ ` (A ⊃ B) ⊃ A ⊃ B
⊃1I
5.2.2 Logical Completeness, Admissibility of Necessi-
tation and Completeness with respect to Hilbert
Axiomatization
In this section, we give a Hilbert axiomatization of the ⊃ fragment of intuition-
istic K logic in order to compare it with our system. Here `H captures the
textbook (metatheoretic) notion of “deduction from assumptions” in a Hilbert
style axiomatization. We assume the restriction of the system to formulas up
to modal degree 1 as we have done throuhgout. This restriction is, firstly, for
pedagogical purposes and, secondly, for pragmatic purposes related to the
programming language applications that we are targeting. Nevertheless, in
chapter 8 we sketch how such restrictions can be dropped.
Hilbert Style Formulation
ax1. A ⊃ (B ⊃ A) ax2. (A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C))
ax3. (A ⊃ (B ⊃ A ∧B)) ax4. (A ∧B) ⊃ A) ax4. (A ∧B) ⊃ B)
K. (A ⊃ B) ⊃ A ⊃ B
MP
A ⊃ B A
B
Nec
`H A
A
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It is easy to verify that axioms 1, 2 are derived theorems of Jcalc in Prop0.
The rule Modus Ponens is trivially admissible, whereas axiom K was shown
to be a theorem in the previous section (5.2.1). The rule of Necessitation is
not obviously admissible though. In our reading of necessity the admissibility
of this rule is directly related to the requirement of “logical completeness
of the interpretation” i.e. preservation of logical theoremhood. In general,
adding more connectives in I would require additional specifications for the
host theory to obtain necessitation.
The steps of the proof are given in the Appendix, but this is essentially
the “lifting lemma” in justification logic [2]. The proof makes essential use of
the provability requirements imposed in the JProp0K fragment.
Lifting Lemma In Jcalc, for every Γ, A ∈ Prop0 if Γ ` A then JΓK ` JAK
and, hence, Γ ` A.
We get admissibility of necessitation as a lemma for Γ empty:
Admissibility of Necessitation For A ∈ Prop0, if ◦ ` A then ◦ ` A.
As a result:
Completeness Jcalc is complete with respect to the Hilbert style formulation
of degree-1 intuitionistic K modal logic.
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5.2.3 Harmony: Local Soundness and Local Complete-
ness
Before we move on to show (Global) Soundness we provide evidence for the
so-called “local soundness” and “local completeness” of the  connective
following Gentzen’s dictum. The local soundness and completeness for the
⊃ connective is given elsewhere (e.g. [45]) and in Gentzen’s original [19].
Gentzen’s program can be described with the following two slogans:
a. Elim is left-inverse to Intro
b. Intro is right-inverse to Elim
Applied to the  connective, the first principle says that introducing a A
(resp. many A1, . . . ,Ai) only to eliminate it (resp. them) directly is
redundant. In other words, the elimination rule cannot give you more data
than what were inserted in the introduction rule(s) (“elimination rules are
not too strong”). We show first the “Elim-After-Singleton-Intro” sub-case.
D E
A JAK
A
A
x
··
B
JAK s
··JBK
B
=⇒R
D
A
··
B
E
JAK
··JBK
B
The exact same principle applies in the “Elim-after-Intro” of multiple s:
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D1 E1
A1 JA1K
A1 . . .
Di E1
Ai JAiK
Ai
A1 . . . Ai
~x
··
B
JA1 . . . AiK ~s
··JBK
B
IBE
x,s
A
=⇒R
D1 Di
A1 . . . . . . Ai
··
B
E1 Ei
JA1 . . . . . . AiK
··JBK
B
IB
These equalities are of importance since they dictate (together with the
corresponding principles for the ⊃, ∧ connectives) the proof dynamics of the
calculus. The proof term assignment and the corresponding computational
(β-)rules are directly instructed by these reduction principles. We see that
eliminating (using) an introduced  corresponds to double substitution in
the corresponding judgments.
Dually, the second principle says eliminating a A , should give enough
information to directly reintroduce it (“elimination rules are not too weak”).
This is an expansion principle.
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D
A =⇒E
D
A A
x JAK s
A
IAE
x,s
A
5.2.4 (Global) Soundness
Soundness is shown by proof theoretic techniques. Standardly, we add the
bottom type (⊥) to Jcalc together with its elimination rule and show that
the system is consistent ( 6` ⊥) by devising a sequent calculus and showing
admissibility of cut. We only present the calculus here and collect the theorems
towards consistency in the Appendix.
In the following, we use Γ ⇒ A (where Γ, A ∈ Prop0 ∪ Prop1) to denote
sequents modulo Γ permutations where Γ is a multiset of Prop (no labels) and
∆⇒ JAK for sequents corresponding to JjudgmentsK of the calculus modulo ∆
permutations (with ∆ (unlabeled) multiset of JProp0K). The multiset/ modulo
permutation approach is instructed by standard structural properties. All
properties are stated formally and proved in the Appendix.
The JΓK⇒ JAK relation is defined directly from `:
Sequent Calculus (JProp0K)
JΓK⇒ JAK := ∃Γ′ ∈ pi(JΓK) s.t Γ′ ` JAK
where pi(JΓK) is the collection of permutations of JΓK.
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Sequent Calculus (Prop)
Γ, A⇒ A
Id
Γ, A ⊃ B,B ⇒ C Γ, A ⊃ B ⇒ A
Γ, A ⊃ B ⇒ C
⊃L
Γ, A⇒ B
Γ⇒ A ⊃ B
⊃R
Γ,⊥ ⇒ A
⊥L
Γ⇒ A JΓK⇒ JAK
Γ⇒ A
LR
Standardly, we extend the system with the Cut rule and we obtain the
extended system Γ ⇒+ A := Γ ⇒ A + Cut. We show Completeness of ⇒+
with respect to Natural Deduction and Admissibility of Cut that leads to the
consistency result.
Consistency of Jcalc 6` ⊥
Chapter 6
Order Theoretic semantics
The previous chapter started by introducing mappings between deductive
systems and motivating the reading of necessity as “double-proof under a
map”. As a result, it is unsurprising that the calculus is amenable to order
theoretic semantics. We present them in this chapter.
6.1 semi-Heyting algebras
In order to progress we first define the notion of a semi-Heyting Algebra
(semi-HA). To define semi-HA we need the notion of a (meet) semi-lattice.
Definition: A (meet) semi-lattice is a non-empty partial order (i.e.
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive) with finite meets.
In addition, we define meet semi-lattice as follows:
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Definition: A bounded (meet) semi-lattice (L,≤) is a (meet) semi-lattice
that additionally has a greatest element (we name it 1), which satisfies
x ≤ 1 for every x in L
Finally, we can define semi-HA:
Definition: A semi-HA is a bounded (meet) semi-lattice (L,≤, 1) s.t.
for every a, b ∈ L there exists an exponential (we name it a → b) with
the properties:
1. a→ b× a ≤ b
2. a→ b is the greatest such element
6.2 Jcalc-Triplets
Given two semi-HAs, we are interested in order preserving functions (functors)
F that also preserve products and exponentials:
Definition A function F between two (semi)-HAs (HA1, HA2) is order
preserving and commutes with top, products and exponentials iff for
every φ, ψ ∈ HA1
1. φ ≤HA1 ψ ⇒ Fφ ≤HA2 Fψ
2. F>HA1 = >HA2
3. F (φ× ψ) = F (φ)× (F (ψ)
4. F (φ→ ψ) = F (ψ)→ F (φ)
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For the order theoretic models of Jcalc the following structures (triplets)
are of interest. We define a Jcalc-triplet as follows:
Definition A Jcalc-triplet is
1. A semi-Heyting algebra HA
2. A partial order J
3. An order preserving function F from HA to J s.t.
(a) The image F (HA) forms a semi-Heyting Algebra
(b) F preserves top, products and exponentials
We are going to utilize the following definition:
Definition Given two partial orders (K,≤K), (L,≤L) and a function
(F : K → L) we can define the algebra of F -points (F : K → L,≤F :K→L)
where:
1. Elements of F : K → L are pairs of the form 〈k, Fk〉
2. 〈k1, Fk1〉 ≤F 〈k2, Fk2〉 iff k1 ≤K k2 and Fk1 ≤L Fk2
Theorem. For any triplet (K,L, F ) of HAs with an order preserving function
F : K → L the algebra of F -points is a partial order.
Proof. It is trivial to show that the algebra of F -points “inherits” reflexivity,
transitivity and antisymmetry from the underlying algebras.
Given a Jcalc-triplet there is an induced F -point algebra:
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Definition Given a Jcalc-triplet we define the algebra FHA as the
induced F -point algebra.
By definition, the FHA point algebra has the following properties:
1. Elements are pairs 〈A,FA〉 (name them FA) where A ∈ HA and FA its
image
2. For every two elements FA, FB:
FA ≤ FB iff A ≤HA B and FA ≤J FB
3. It is a Heyting algebra with:
• F> := 〈>HA, F>HA = >J〉
• Elements of the form F (A × B) forming products (we name them
FA×FB)
• Elements of the form F (A → B) forming exponentials (name them
FA→ FB)
The last property is not obvious so we will sketch the proof. We will be
omitting indexes in the ≤ relations since they can be trivially inferred:
FHA is Heyting
Proof. F> is a top element since for any A ∈ HA, A ≤ > and thusly
FA ≤ F> = >J and thus by definition FA ≤ F> for any FA.
For any two elements FA, FB, the element F (A × B) forms their
product since, A×B ≤ A in HA and F (A×B) = FA×FB ≤ FA in J , and
thusly, F (A×B) ≤ FA (in FHA). Analogously, F (A×B) ≤ FA.
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In addition, F (A×B) is the product we need to show that is the greatest
element with the previous property. I.e. for any FC s.t. FC ≤ FA and
FC ≤ FB we get FC ≤ F (A×B). By the definition for any such FC
we have C ≤ A×B and FC ≤ F (A×B) that imply FC ≤ F (A×B).
To show that F (A → B) is the exponential of FA, FB we have
to show first that F (A → B) × FA ≤ FB. By the FHA product
definition F (A→ B)×FA := F ((A→ B)×A). Also, by the underlying
exponentials we have (A → B) × A ≤ B and F ((A → B) × A) = (FA →
FB)×FA ≤ FB that by definition of FHA gives F ((A→ B)×A) ≤ FB
and hence, by definition, F (A→ B)×FA ≤ FB.
In addition, we have to show that F (A→ B) is the greatest element with
the previous property. Consider any other FC s.t. FC ×FA ≤ FB, by
definitions of F and its products we obtain: C×A ≤ B and FC×FA ≤ FB.
By the definitions of the underlying exponentials we get C ≤ A → B and
FC ≤ FA → FB = F (A → B). And again by definition of FHA,
FC ≤ F (A→ B).
6.3 Jcalc Algebras: Soundness and Complete-
ness
Given a Jcalc-triplet we can define a Jcalc algebra:
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Definition Given a Jcalc-triplet we define the corresponding Jcalc-
algebra as the union of the underlying relations of HA, F (HA), FHA
Theorem. Soundness and completeness
Γ `Jcal φ iff for any Jcalc algebra JC (HA,F, J) and any ∗ map that extends a
map of atomic Props (pi) to elements of HA with properties shown below and
(+) is defined inductively on the length of Γ as shown below then Γ+ ≤ φ∗.
(>)∗ = >
(A ∧B ∈ Prop0)∗ = A ∗ ×HAB∗
(A ⊃ B ∈ Prop0)∗ = A∗ →HA B∗
(JAK)∗ = F (A∗)
(A)∗ = FA∗
(A ⊃ B)∗ = FA∗ → FB∗
(A ∧B)∗ = FA ∗ ×FB∗
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◦+ = >
†+ = J>K
(◦)+ = F>
(Γ, φ ∈ Prop0)+ = Γ+ ×HA φ∗
(JΓK, JφK ∈ JProp0K)+ = Γ+ ×J Fφ∗
(Γ,φ ∈ Prop1)+ = Γ+ ×FHA F (φ)∗
Proof. To prove soundness we go by induction on the derivations. For the
Prop0 fragment the proof is well-known from intuitionistic logic semantics
(Γ ∈ Prop0 ` φ ∈ Prop0 ⇒ Γ+ ≤HA φ∗) . For the JProp0K part of the calculus
again by induction. Reflection, of contexts is trivial. For the axiomatic cases,
it is a well known result that in any Heyting algebra (and, subsequently,
in F (HA) of any Jcalc algebra) elements of the shape of the axiomatic
combinators are equivalent (equiprovable) to >. For example in any Heyting
algebra we have > ≤ A→ (B → A) (using the definition of exponentials twice
from the fact >×A×B ≤ A), the modus ponens case is handled by induction
and the properties of F (preserving exponentials). Hence, (JΓK)++ ≤ (JφK)∗
for any deduction in JProp0K.
The interesting part of the proof is the  rule which we present again
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here for readability:
Judgments on Necessity
with Γ ∈ Prop1, length(Γ) = i, 1 ≤ k ≤ i and, Γ′, A,Ak, B ∈ Prop0
(∀Ai ∈ Γ′. Γ ` Ai) Γ′ ` B JΓ′K ` JBK
Γ ` B
IBE
~x,~s
A1...Ai
By the induction hypothesis we have (Γ′)+ ≤ B∗ and (JΓ′K)+ ≤ FB∗ or
equivalently by the properties of F F ((Γ′)+) ≤ F (B∗) which gives F (Γ′)+ ≤
FB Additionally from induction hypothesis, for every Ai in Γ+FAi and
by the product definition Γ+ ≤ (Γ′)+ and thus Γ+ ≤ FB∗.
For the inverse we create a Lindenbaum construction. We sketch the
construction:
• Create a preorder pre-HA with underlying set (isomorphic to) Prop0
• Define φ ≤ ψ iff φ ` ψ
• Define the equivalence relation φ ≡ ψ iff φ ≤ ψ and ψ ≤ φ
• Define the quotient pre-HA/≡
• Show that it is a Heyting Algebra with products the elements of of shape
φ ∧ ψ, top > and exponentials φ ⊃ ψ
• Repeat the construction for the syntactic elements of JProp0K, with JφK ≤JψK iff JφK ` JψK. Show that it is a Heyting algebra J
• Repeat the construction for the syntactic elements of Prop1 and φ ≤ ψ
iff φ ` ψ
• Show that the union of the three relations above forms a Jcalc algebra with
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F := A 7→ JAK. I.e. show that:
– A ` B ⇒ JAK ` JBK (Holds by the lifting lemma)
– JA ∧ BK is product (trivial) and JA ⊃ BK (trivial given the deduction
theorem which we have shown) in J
– A ` B iff A ` B and JAK ` JBK Easy by induction on the derivations
and usage of the lifting lemma
Now assume that Γ+ ≤ φ∗ for any Jcalc algebra and mapping ∗; consider ∗
to extend the identity mapping into the (free) Jcalc algebra defined above. It
is trivial to see that in Jcalc Γ ` φ.
Chapter 7
The computational side of Jcalc
In this section we add proof terms to represent natural deduction constructions.
The meaning of these terms emerges naturally from Gentzen’s principles
that give reduction (computational β-rules) and expansion (extensionality
η-rules) equalities for each construct. We focus on the new constructs of the
calculus that emerge from the judgmental interpretation of the  connective
as explained in section 5.2. In addition, we focus on the implicational part.
The proof term assignment for ∧ rules is standard and can be added.
There will be no computational (reduction) rules on provability terms.
This conforms with our reading of these terms as references to proof constructs
of an abstracted theory J that can be realized differently for a concrete J .
77
78
7.1 Proof term assignment
The following rules and their correspondence with natural deduction constructs
(5.2.1) should be obvious to the reader familiar with the simply typed λ-
calculus and basic justification logic. We do not repeat the corresponding
β, η equality rules since they are standard.
Judgments on Truth Γ, A,B ∈ Prop0 and M := xi | <> | λx : A. M | (MM)
x : A ∈ Γ
Γ ` x : A
Γ0-Refl
Γ ` <>: >
>0I
Γ, x : A `M : B
Γ ` λx : A. M : A ⊃ B
⊃0I
Γ `M : A ⊃ B Γ `M ′ : A
Γ ` (MM ′) : B
⊃0E
+ βη equalities for >,⊃
For judgments of JProp0K, we assume a countable set of constant names
and demand that every combinatorial axiom of intuitionistic logic has a
witness under the interpretation J•K. This is what justification logicians
call “axiomatically appropriate constant specification”. As usual we demand
reflection of contexts in J and preservation of modus ponens – closedness
under some notion of application (which we denote as ∗).
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Judgments on Validity ∆ ∈ JProp0K and J := si | Ci | J ∗ J
s : JAK ∈ ∆
∆ ` s : JAK ∆-Refl ∆ ` C> : J>K Ax1
A,B ∈ Prop0
∆ ` CKA,B : JA ⊃ (B ⊃ A)K Ax2
A,B,C ∈ Prop0
∆ ` CSA,B,C : JA ⊃ (B ⊃ C) ⊃ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C))K Ax3
∆ ` J : JA ⊃ BK ∆ ` J′ : JAK
∆ ` J ∗ J′ : JBK App
If J is a proof calculus and J•KJ is an interpretation such that the specifications
above are realized, then J can witness intuitionistic provability. This can be
shown by the proof relevant version of the lifting lemma that states:
J•KLifting Lemma Given Γ, A ∈ Prop0 s.t. and a term M s.t. Γ ` M : A
then there exists J s.t JΓK ` J : JAK.
7.1.1 Proof term assignment and Gentzen Equalities
for  Judgments
Before we proceed, we will give a small primer of let-bindings as used in modern
programming languages to provide for some intuition on how such terms
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work. Let us assume a rudimentary programming language that supports
some basic types, say integers (int), as well as pairs of such types. Moreover,
let us define a datatype Point as a pair of int i.e. as (int, int) In a language
with let-bindings one can define a simple function that takes a Point and
“shifts” it by adding 1 to each of its x and y coordinates as follows:
de f s h i f t (p : Point ) =
l e t (x , y ) be p
in
( x+1,y+1)
If we call this function on the point (2,3), the computation
let (x,y) be (2,3) in (x+1,y+1)
is invoked. This expression reduces following the let reduction rule (i.e.
pattern matching and substitution) to (2+1,3+1); and as a result we obtain
the value (3,4). As we will see, let bindings – with appropriate typing
restrictions for our system – are used in the assignment of proof terms for
the IE rule. Moreover, the reduction principle for such terms (β-rule) –
obtained following Gentzen’s equalities for the  connective – is exactly the
one that we just informally described.
We can now move forward with the proof term assignment for the IE
rule. We show first the sub-cases for Γ′ empty (pure I) and Γ′ singleton
and explain the computational significance utilizing Gentzen’s principles
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appropriated for the  connective. We are directly translating proof tree
equalities from 5.2.3 to proof term equalities. We generalize for arbitrary Γ′
in the following subsection. We have, respectively, the following instances:
Γ ∈ Prop1 ◦ `M : B † ` J : JBK
Γ `M&J : B
Γ ` N : A x : A `M : B s : JAK ` J : JBK
Γ ` let (x&s be N) in (M&J) : B
7.1.2 Gentzen’s Equalities for ( terms)
Gentzen’s reduction and expansion principles give computational meaning
(dynamics) and an extensionality principle for linking terms. We omit naming
the empty contexts for economy.
I
Γ ∈ Prop1 `M : A ` j : JAK
Γ `M&j : A x : A `M ′ : B s : JAK ` j′ : JBK
Γ ` let (x&s) be (M&J) in (M ′&J′) : B
IBE
x,s
A
=⇒R
Γ ∈ Prop1 `M ′[M/x] : B ` J′[J/s] : JBK
Γ `M ′[M/x]&J′[j/s] : B
IB
Where the expressions M ′[M/x] and J′[J/s] denote capture avoiding substitu-
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tion, reflecting proof compositionality of the two calculi.
Following the expansion principle we obtain:
Γ `M : A =⇒E
Γ `M : A x : A ` x : A s : JAK ` s : JAK
Γ ` let (x&s be M) in (x&s) : A
IAE
x,s
A
That gives an η-equality principle as follows:
M : A =η let (x&s be M) in (x&s) : A
The η equality demands that every M : A should be reducible to a form
M ′&J′.
7.1.3 Proof term assignment for the  rule (Generi-
cally)
After understanding the computational meaning of let expressions in the IE
rule we can now give proof term assignment for the rule in the general case(i.e.
for Γ′ of arbitrary length). We define a helper syntactic construct (namely,
let∗ . . . in ) as syntactic sugar for iterative let bindings based on the structure
of contexts. The let∗ macro takes four arguments: a context Γ ∈ Prop0, a
context ∆ ∈ JProp1K, a possibly empty ([ ]) list of terms Ns := N1, . . . , Ni -
all three of the same length - and a term M . It is defined as follows for the
empty and non-empty cases:
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let∗ (◦; †; [ ]) in M := M
let∗ (x1 : A1, . . . , xi : Ai ; s1 : φ1, . . . , si : φi; N1, . . . , Ni) in M :=
let {(x1&s1) be N1, . . . , (xi&si) be Ni} in M
Using this syntactic definition the rule IE rule can be written compactly:
IE With Γ ∈ Prop1, Γ′ ∈ Prop0, length(Γ) = i, Ns := N1... Ni, 1 ≤ k ≤ i
∀Ak ∈ Γ′. Γ ` Nk : Ak Γ′ `M : B JΓ′K ` J : JBK
Γ ` let∗ (Γ′, JΓ′K, Ns) in (M&J) : B IBE~x,~sA1...Ai
It is obvious that all previously mentioned cases are captured with this
formulation. The rule of β-equality can be given for multi-let bindings
directly from Gentzen’s reduction principle (5.2.3) generalized for the multiple
intro case:
let{(x1&s1) be (M1&J1), . . . , (xi&si) be (Mi&Ji)} in (M&J) =β
M [M1/x1, . . . ,Mi/xi]&J[J1/s1, . . . , Ji/si]
7.2 Strong Normalization and small-step se-
mantics
In the appendix (B) we provide a proof of normalization for natural deduction
(via cut elimination). This is, mutatis mutandis, a strong normalization result
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for the proof term system too. A weaker result is normalization under a
deterministic,“call-by-value” reduction strategy for β-rules. This gives an
idea of how the system computes and we can use it in the applications in
the next section. As usual we characterize a subset of the closed terms as
values and we provide rules for the reduction of the non-value closed terms.
Note that for the constants of validity and their applicative closure we do
not observe reduction properties but treat them as values – again conforming
with the idea of J (and its reduction principles) being “black boxed”.
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Small step, call-by-value reduction →
λx.M value Ci value
J1 value J2 value
J1 ∗ J2 value
M value J value
M&J value
M →M ′
M&J→M ′&J
N1 value . . . Nk−1 value Nk → N ′k
let{(x1&s1) be N1, . . . , (xk&sk) be Nk, . . .} in M →
let{(x1&s1) be N1, . . . , (xk&sk) be N ′k, . . .} in M
M1&J1 value . . . Mi&Ji value
let{(x1&s1) be (M1&J1), . . . , (xi&si) be (Mi&Ji)} in (M&J)→
M [M1/x1, . . . ,Mi/xi]&J[J1/s1, . . . , Ji/si]
M →M ′
(MN)→ (M ′N)
N → N ′
((λx.M)N)→ ((λx.M)N ′)
N value
((λx.M)N)→ [N/x]M
Using the reducibility candidates proof method [21]) we show:
Termination Under Small Step Reduction With →∗ being the reflex-
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ive transitive closure of →: for every closed term M and A ∈ Prop if `M : A
then there exists N value s.t. ` N : A and M →∗ N .
7.3 A programming language view: Dynamic
Linking and separate compilation
Our type system can be related to programming language design when
considering Foreign Function Interfaces. This is a typical scenario in which a
language I interfaces another language J which is essentially “black boxed”.
For example, OCaml code might call C code to perform certain computations.
In such cases I is a client and J is a host that provides implementations for
an interface utilized by the client. In the course of software development,
the implementations of such an interface might often change (i.e. a new
version of the host language, or more dramatically, a complete switch of
host language). We want a language design that satisfies two interconnected
properties. Firstly, separate compilation i.e. when implementations change
we do not have to recompile client code and, secondly, dynamic linking we
want the client code to be linked dynamically to its new “meaning”.
We will assume that both languages are functional and based on the
lambda calculus. I.e. our interpretation function should have the property
JA ⊃ BKJ= JAKJJ⊃KJJBKJ where J⊃KJ is the implication type constructor in
J . The specifics of the host J and the concrete implementations are unknown
to I but during the linker construction we assume that both languages share
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some basic types for otherwise typed “communication” of the two languages
would be impossible. Simplifying, we consider that the only shared type is
(int), i.e. the linker construction assumes n¯ : JintK for every integer n : int. Let
us now assume source code in I that is interfacing a simple data structure,
say an integer stack1, with the following signature Σ:
us ing type i n t s t a c k
empty : in t s tack ,
push : i n t −> i n t s t a c k −> i n t s tack ,
pop : i n t s t a c k −> i n t
And let us consider a simple program in I that is using the signature say,
pop(push (1+1) empty):int
This program involves two kinds of computations: a redex (1 + 1) that can
be reduced using the internal semantics of the language 1 + 1  I 2 and
the signature calls pop (push 2 empty) that are to be performed externally
in whichever host language implements them. We treat dynamic linkers as
“term re-writers” that map a computation to its meaning(s) based on different
implementations. In the following we consider Σ to be the signature of the
interface. Here are the steps towards the linker construction.
1. Reduce the source code based on the operational semantics of I until it
1The details of the stack implementation do not really matter here. It is only “gluing”
types together correctly that is observed by our type system. Nevertheless, to avoid usage
of pair types we assume that the pop operations are “impure”. I.e. that they modify the
very same object and return its top element.
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doesn’t have a redex:
Σ; •` pop(push (1 + 1) Empty) pop(push 2 Empty) : int
2. Contextualize the use of the signature at the final term in step 1:
Σ; x1 : intstack, x2 : int→ intstack→ intstack, x3 : intstack→ int
` x3(x2 2 x1) : int
3. Rewrite the previous judgment assuming (abstract) implementations for the
corresponding missing elements using the “known” specification for the shared
elements.
s1 : JinstackK, s2 : Jint→ intstack→ intstackK, s3 : Jintstack→ intK
` s3 ∗ (s2 ∗ 2¯ ∗ s1) : JintK
4. Combine the two previous judgments using the IE rule.
Σ; x′1 : intstack, x′2 : (int→ intstack→ intstack),
x′3 : (intstack→ int)
` let{x1&s1 be x′1, x2&s2 be x′2, x3&s3 be x′3} in
(x3(x2 2 x1) & s3 ∗ (s2 ∗ 2¯ ∗ s1)) : int
5. Using λ-abstraction three times we obtain the dynamic linker:
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Σ; ◦ ` linker = λx′1. λx′2.λx′3.let{x1&s1 be x′1, x2&s2 be x′2, x3&s3 be x′3} in
(x3(x2 2 x1) & s3 ∗ (s2 ∗ 2¯ ∗ s1))
: (instack)→ (int→ intstack→ intstack)
→ (intstack→ int)→ int
Let us see how it can be used in the presence of different implementations:
1. Suppose the developer responsible for the implementation of the interface
is providing an array based implementation for the stack in some language
J i.e. we get references to type-checked code fragments of J as follows2:
create() : intarray, add array : intJ →J intarray→J intarray
pop array : intarray→J int
2. A unification algorithm check is performed to verify the conformance of the
implementations to the signature taking into account fixed type sharing
equalities (JintK = intJ). In our case it produces:
J→K =→J, JintstackK = intarray
3. We thus obtain type-checked links using the I rule. For example:
2We have changed the return type of pop to avoid products. This is just for economy
and products can easily be handled.
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Σ; ◦ ` push : int→ intstack→ intstack
• ` add array : Jint→ intstack→ intstackK
Σ; ◦ ` push & add array : (int→ intstack→ intstack)
And analogously:
Σ; ◦ ` pop & pop array : (intstack→ int)
Σ; ◦ ` empty &create() : intstack
4. Finally we can compute the next step in the computation for the expression
applying the linker to the obtained pairings:
Σ; •` (linker (empty & create()) (push & add array) (pop & pop array))
: int
which reduces to:
Σ; • `let{(x1&s1) be (empty &create()), (x2&s2) be (push & add array),
(x3&s3) be (pop & pop array)}
in (x3(x2 2 x1) & s3 ∗ (s2 ∗ 2¯ ∗ s1)) : int
The last expression reduces to (β-reduction for let):
Σ; • ` pop(push 2 empty) & pop array ∗ (add array ∗ 2¯ ∗ empty) : int
giving exactly the next step of the computation for the source expression.
The good news is that the linker computes correctly the next step given
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any conforming set of implementations. It is easy to see that given
a list implementation the very same process would produce a different
computation step:
Σ; • ` pop(push 2 empty) & pop list ∗ (Cons ∗ 2¯ ∗ []) : int
We conclude with some remarks that:
• The construction gives a mechanism of abstractions that works not only
over different implementations in the same language but even for imple-
mentations in different (applicative) languages.
• We assumed in the example that the two languages are based on the lambda
calculus and implement a curried, higher-order function space. It is easy
to see that such host satisfies the requirements for the J•K (with CS, CK
being the S,K combinators in λ form and ∗ translating to λ application).
• Often, the host language of a foreign call is not a language that satisfies
such specifications. This situation occurs when we have bindings from a
functional language to a lower level language 3. Such cases can be captured
by adding conjunction (and pairs), tuning the specifications of J accordingly
and loosening the assumption that J•K is total on types.
• Introduction of modal types is clearly relative to the J•K function on types.
It would be interesting to consider examples where J•K is realized by non-
trivial mappings such as JA ⊃ BK =!A ( B from the embedding on
intuitionistic logic to intuitionistic linear logic. That will showcase an
3In this setting the type signature of push would be: int× intstack→ instack
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example of modality that works when lifting to a completely different logic
or, correspondingly, to an essentially different computational model.
• Finally, it should be clear from the operational semantics and this example
that we did not demand any equalities (or, reduction rules) for the proofs in
J , but mere existence of specific terms. This is in accordance to justification
logic. Analogously, we did not observe computation in the host language
but only the construction of the linkers as program transformers. We were
careful, to say that our calculus corresponds to the dynamic linking part
of separate compilation. This, of course, does not tell the whole story of
program execution in such cases. Foreign function calls, return the control
to the client after the result gets calculated in the external language. For
example, the execution of the program pop (push 2 empty) + 2 should
“escape” the client to compute the stack calls and then return for the last
addition. Our modality captures exclusively the passing of control from the
client to the host dynamically and, as such, is a K (non-factive) modality.
Capturing the continuation of the computation and the return of the control
back to the source would require a factive modality and a notion of “reverse”
of the mapping J•K. We touch on this subject in the next chapter and we
would like to explore such an extension in future work.
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7.4 Related and Future Work
Directly related work with our calculus, in the same fashion that justification
logic and LP [2] are related to modal logic, is [11]. The work in [11] provides
a calculus for explicit assignments (substitutions) which is actually a sub-case
of Jcalc with J•K being identity. This sub-case captures dynamic linking where
the host language is the very same one; such need appears in languages with
module mechanisms (i.e. implementation hiding and separate compilation
within the very same language). In general, the judgmental approach to
modality is heavily influenced by [41]. In a sense, our treatment of validity-
as-explicit-provability also generalizes the approach there without having to
commit to a “factive” modality. Finally, important results on programming
paradigms related to justification logic have been obtained in [7, 10, 13].
Immediate future developments would be to interpret modal formulas of
higher degree under the same principles. This corresponds to dynamic linking
in two or more steps (i.e., when the host becomes itself a client of another
interface that is implemented dynamically in a third level and, so on). Some
preliminary results towards this direction have been developed in [44] and we
sketch them in the next section.
Chapter 8
Notes on extending the calculus
In this chapter we will make an informal case about the scalability of the
presented system. We will sketch how the calculus can easily be extended
in different ways and support that such extensions are of interest from a
trinitarian (logic/ type theory/ category theory) point of view.
8.1 Extending on higher order modal types
We saw in Chapter 6 how the calculus corresponds to Jcalc algebras which
are essentially pairs of Heyting algebras under an order preserving function.
The points of such functions correspond to ed types.
A FA
B FB
A
B
` `
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This structure is easily extensible to account for ed types of higher
degree. Instead of a pair of Heyting algebras we could have a tower of Heyting
algebras related with order preserving functions as shown in the schema.
A F0A F1F0A
B F0B F1F0B
A
B
FA
FB
A
B
` ` `
In a nutshell, instead of one function symbol J•K the system can be
axiomatized to reason about chains of composable (provability) preserving
functions. The modifications required are minor to obtain such a system.
Instead of one function symbol J•K we have a collection F0, F1 . . . Fj and we
define for any formula A ∈ Propi, FiA := FiA (and, similarly, lifting
over the connectives: Fi(A ⊃ B) := FiA ⊃ FiB). The rule can then
be written:
Judgments on Necessity
with Γ ∈ Propi, length(Γ) = j, 1 ≤ k ≤ j and, Γ′, A,Ak, B ∈ Propi−1
(∀Ai ∈ Γ′. Γ ` Ai) Γ′ ` B FiΓ′ ` FiB
Γ ` B
IBE
~x,~s
A1...Aj
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8.2 From order theory to category theory
There is a classic passage from orders to categories, which corresponds to the
passage of provability to proof relevance. The main idea is that instances
(Γ ≤ φ) of the inequality relation arising from an order theoretic treatment of a
deductive system are now refined to (equivalent classes) of arrows M : Γ =⇒ φ.
Each term M is corresponding to a different deduction of φ from Γ. Order
preserving functions become functors in the categorical scenario. But functors
behave functionally on terms; they preserve proof equalities or, essentially,
normalization principles of the cut elimination process. To account, hence,
for a categorical semantics of the system one has to account for equality in
the higher level of the system (i.e. on justifications).
This idea is actually not foreign in literature that explores the relation
between lambda calculus and (typed) combinatory logic and, moreover, it
is tempting to introduce equality between justifications so that one could
more accurately describe computational phenomena arising when a language
interacts with another language (or, its own modules).
Generalizing from the order theoretic semantics, we would expect a system
in which J•K would correspond to functors (preserving the connectives and
hence, βη equalities). We are expecting an extension of Jcalc with rules for
βη equalities on the level of justifications to fit exactly the bill.
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8.3 Factivity and adjunctions
Having an understanding of the system in order theoretic/ categorical terms
facilitates thinking about extensions. In any category theoretic textbook, the
next “tighter” relation between categories is that of an adjunction. Interest-
ingly, adjunctions arise from the relation of classical and intuitionistic proofs.
Also, adjunctions play an important role in functional programming theory
as the backbone of monadic computation.
We would expect that our view of necessity as a means of controlling
two proof systems could be extended to cover such a notion. In order-
theoretic terms, an adjunction between two partial orders C,D is a pair of
order preserving functions L : D → C, R : C → D such that there is an
isomorphism: ∀d ∈ D, c ∈ C. Ld ≤ c ←→ d ≤ Rc. A logically interesting
example of an adjunction is that between intuitionistic proofs and classical
proofs where the left adjunct is inclusion and the right one is double negation
translation and we have:
I(Γ) ` φ
Γ ` ¬¬φ
↓↑
To axiomatize such notions in Jcalc one should add another function symbol
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to correspond to R and add the rule:
JΓK `J j : φ
Γ ` return (j) : Rφ
R
This is enough to obtain a generalized notion of Factivity:
JΓK `M : φ
Γ ` let s =M in return (s) : RJφK R
Such an extension gives the standard factivity rule if the composition RJ•K =
id. With such a rule, a system can capture phenomena in which a language is
giving control to another language partially to calculate a result but it retains
control back for the continuation its program.
To conclude, our system captures a basic fragment of justification logic
within a Curry–Howard isomorphism. Justification logic provides a rich,
higher-order system with reflection. We expect that it can be deployed to
provide foundations for richer typed programming language interaction.
Appendix A
Theorems
Deduction Theorem for Validity Judgments With ∆ ` JwfK, if ∆, s :
JAK ` JBK then ∆ ` JA ⊃ BK.
Proof. The proof is essentially the deduction theorem for a Hilbert style
formulation of the corresponding fragment of propositional logic and we do
not show it here for economy. Note that this theorem cannot be proven without
the logical specification Ax1, Ax2. I.e. it is exactly the requirements of the
logical specification that ensure that all interpretations should adequately
embed intuitionistic implication.
J·KLifting Lemma Given any wellformed context of assumptions Γ ` wf
and Γ, A ∈ Prop0 then Γ ` A =⇒ JΓK ` JAK.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the derivations trivially for all the
cases(⊃E is treated using the App rule that internalizes Modus ponens). For
the ⊃ I the previous theorem has to be used.
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Lifting Lemma For Γ, A ∈ Prop0, then Γ ` A implies Γ ` A.
Proof. Assuming a derivation D ::Γ ` A, from the previous item, there exists
corresponding validity derivation E :: JΓK ` JAK. Using the two as premises
in the IE with Γ := Γ we obtain Γ ` A.
Let us show an inverse principle to the  Lifting Lemma. We define for A in
Prop1:
 (A1 ⊃ A2) = A1 ⊃ A2
 A = A
And the lifting of the  over Γ ∈ Prop. We get:
Collapse  Lemma If Γ ` A for Γ, A ∈ Prop1 then  Γ ` A.
Weakening For the N.D. system of Jcalc, with Γ,Γ′ ` wf and ∆,∆′ ` JwfK.
1. If Γ ` A then Γ,Γ′ ` A.
2. If ∆ ` JAK then ∆,∆′ ` JAK.
Proof. By induction on derivations.
Contraction For the N.D. system of Jcalc, with Γ, x : A, x′ : A,Γ′ ` wf and
∆, s : JAK, s′ : JAK,∆′ ` JwfK.
1. If Γ, x : A, x′ : A,Γ′ ` B then Γ, x : A,Γ′ ` B.
2. If ∆, s : JAK, s′ : JAK,∆′ ` JBK then ∆, s : JAK,∆′ ` JBK.
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Proof. By induction on derivations.
Permutation For the N.D. system of Jcalc, with Γ ` wf and ∆ ` JwfK and
piΓ and pi∆ the collection of well-formed contexts of assumptions with the
same co-domain of Γ, ∆ we get
1. If Γ ` A and Γ′ ∈ piΓ then Γ′ ` A.
2. If ∆ ` JAK and ∆′ ∈ pi∆ then ∆′ ` JAK.
Proof. By induction on derivations.
Substitution Principle The following hold for both kinds of judgments:
1. If Γ, x : A ` B and Γ ` A then Γ ` B
2. If ∆, s : JAK ` JBK and∆ ` JAK then ∆ ` JBK
All previous theorems can be stated for proof terms too. Specifically:
Deduction Theorem / Emulation of λ abstraction With ∆ ` JwfK, if
∆, s : JAK ` j : JBK then there exists j’ s.t. ∆ ` j′ : JA ⊃ BK.
J·KLifting Lemma for terms If ΓA ∈ Prop0 and Γ ` M : A then there
exists j s.t. JΓK ` j : JAK.
In both theorems the existence of this j, j′ is algorithmic following the induction
principle of the proof.
Appendix B
Notes on the cut elimination
proof and normalization of
natural deduction
Standardly, we add the bottom type and elimination rule in the natural
deduction and show that in Jcalc + ⊥: 6` ⊥. The addition goes as follows:
⊥ ∈ Prop0
Bot
Γ ` ⊥ A ∈ Prop
Γ ` A
E⊥
Our proof strategy follows directly [38]. We construct an intercalation calculus
[47] corresponding to the Prop fragment with the following two judgments:
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A ⇑ for “Proposition A has normal deduction”.
A↓ for “Proposition A is extracted from hypothesis”.
This calculus is, essentially, restricting the natural deduction to canonical
derivations. The JjudgmentsK are not annotated and are directly ported from
the natural deduction since we observe consistency in Prop. The construction
is identical to [38] (Chapter 3) for the Hypotheses,Coercion,⊃,⊥ cases, we
add the  case.
x : A ↓∈ Γ↓
Γ↓ `− A ↓
Γ-hyp
Γ↓ `− A ↓
Γ↓ `− A ⇑
↓⇑
Γ↓, x : A ↓`− B ⇑
Γ↓ `− A ⊃ B ⇑
⊃Ix
Γ↓ `− A ⊃ B ↓ Γ↓ `− A ⇑
Γ↓ `− B ↓
⊃E
Γ↓ `− ⊥ ↓ A ∈ Prop
Γ↓ `− A ⇑
E⊥
Γ ↓` A ⇑ JΓK ` JAK
Γ ↓` A ⇑
IE
We prove simultaneously by induction:
Soundness of Normal Deductions The following hold:
1. If Γ↓ `− A ⇑ then Γ ` A, and
2. If Γ↓ `− A ↓ then Γ ` A.
Proof. Simultaneously by induction on derivations.
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It is easy to see that this restricted proof system 6` −⊥ ⇑. It is hard to
show its completeness to the non-restricted natural deduction (` +⊥E of
Jcalc) directly. For that reason we add a rule to make it complete (`+)
preserving soundness and get a system of Annotated Deductions. We show
the correspondence of the restricted system (`−) to a cut-free sequent calculus
(JSeq), the correspondence of the extended system (`+) to Jseq + Cut and
show cut elimination.1
To obtain completeness we add the rule:
Γ↓ ` A ⇑
Γ↓ ` A ↓
⇑↓
We define `+:= `− with ⇑↓Rule. We show:
Soundness of Annotated Deductions The following hold:
1. If Γ↓ `+ A ⇑ then Γ ` A, and
2. If Γ↓ `+ A ↓ then Γ ` A.
Proof. As previous item.
Completeness of Annotated Deductions The following hold:
1. If Γ ` A then, Γ ↓`+ A ⇑, and
2. If Γ ` A, then Γ ↓`+ A ↓.
Proof. By induction over the structure of the Γ ` A derivation.
1In reality, the sequent calculus formulation is built exactly upon intuitions on the
intercalation calculus. We refer the reader to the references.
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Next we move with devising a sequent calculus formulation corresponding
to normal proofs Γ↓ `− A ⇑. The calculus that is given in the main body of
this theorem. We repeat it here for completeness.
Sequent Calculus (JProp0K)
∆⇒ JAK := ∃∆′ ∈ pi(∆) s.t ∆′ ` JAK
where pi(∆) is the collection of wellformed JProp0K contexts ∆′ ` JwfK
with some permutation of the multiset ∆ as co-domain.
Sequent Calculus (Prop)
Γ, A⇒ A
Id
Γ, A ⊃ B,B ⇒ C Γ, A ⊃ B ⇒ A
Γ, A ⊃ B ⇒ C
⊃L
Γ, A⇒ B
Γ⇒ A ⊃ B
⊃R
Γ,⊥ ⇒ A
⊥L
Γ⇒ A JΓK⇒ JAK
Γ⇒ A
LR
We want to show correspondence of the sequent calculus w.r.t normal proofs
(`−). Two lemmas are required to show soundness.
Substitution principle for extractions The following hold:
1. If Γ↓1, x : A↓,Γ↓2 `− B ⇑ and
Γ↓1 `− A ⇑ then Γ↓1,Γ↓2 `− B ⇑
2. If Γ↓1, x : A↓,Γ↓2 `− B ↓ and Γ↓1 `− A ↓ then Γ↓1,Γ↓2 `− B ⇑
Proof. Simultaneously by induction on the derivations A ↓ and A ⇑.
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And making use of the previous we can show, with ( A defined previously):
Collapse principle for normal deductions The following hold:
1. If Γ↓,`− A ⇑ then  Γ↓ `− A ⇑ and,
2. If Γ↓ `− A ↓ then  Γ↓ `− A ↓
Using the previous lemmas and by induction we can show :
Soundness of the Sequent Calculus If Γ⇒ B then Γ↓ `− B ⇑.
Soundness of the Sequent Calculus with Cut If Γ ⇒+ B then Γ↓ `+
B ⇑.
Next we define the Γ⇒+ A as Γ⇒ A plus the rule:
Γ⇒+ A Γ, A⇒+ B
Γ⇒+ B
Cut
Proof. As before. The cut rule case is handled by the ⇑↓ and substitution
for extractions principle showcasing the correspondence of the cut rule to the
coercion from normal to extraction derivations.
Standard structural properties (Weakening, Contraction) to show com-
pleteness. We do not show these here but they hold.
Completeness of the Sequent Calculus The following hold:
1. If Γ↓ `− B ⇑ then Γ⇒ B and,
2. If Γ↓ `− A ↓ and Γ, A⇒ B then Γ⇒ B
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Proof. Simultaneously by induction on the given derivations making use of
the structural properties.
Similarly we show for the extended systems.
Completeness of the Sequent Calculus with Cut The following hold:
1. If Γ↓ `+ B ⇑ then Γ⇒+ B and,
2. If Γ↓ `+ A ↓ and Γ, A⇒+ B then Γ⇒+ B.
Proof. As before. The extra case is handled by the Cut rule.
After establishing the correspondence of `− with ⇒ and of `+ with ⇒+ we
move on with:
Admissibility of Cut If Γ⇒ A and Γ, A⇒ B then Γ⇒ B.
The proof is by double induction on the structure of the formula, its (sub-
)derivations. This gives easily:
Cut Elimination If Γ⇒+ A then Γ⇒ A.
Which in turn gives us:
Normalization for Natural Deduction If Γ ` A then Γ↓ `− A ⇑
Proof. From assumption Γ ` A which by completeness of annotated de-
ductions gives Γ `+ A ⇑. Then by completeness of sequent calculus and
Cut Elimination we obtain Γ⇒ A which by soundness of sequent calculus
completes the proof.
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As a result we obtain:
Proof. By contradiction, assume ` ⊥ then ⇒ ⊥ which is not possible.
Appendix C
Makam Implementation
A Github repository [49] is preserved for Jcalc, which includes an implementa-
tion in the metaprogramming framework Makam [48]. The implementation is
currently developed by Antonis Stampoulis and the author. A type checker for
Jcalc terms has been implemented and the call-by-value evaluation strategy
is under current development.
The interested reader should install Makam (in a unix environment) and
then can run the executable run.sh file included in the repository. A successful
run will verify a number of Jcalc theorems encoded in the file just.md and
will additionally output an html file (already included in the repository as
just.html). The obtained file is a notebook of (pretty-printed) Latex and
Makam code that can be opened in any modern browser. It showcases how
the implementation faithfully follows the rules of the formal system.
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